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Abstract 
This article explores how issuer liability re-allocates fraud risk and how risk 
allocation may reduce the incidence of fraud. In the US, the apparent absence of 
individual liability of officeholders and insufficient monitoring by insurers under-
mine the potential deterrent effect of securities litigation. The underlying reasons 
why both mechanisms remain ineffective are collective action problems under the 
prevailing dispersed ownership structure, which eliminates the incentives to moni-
tor set by issuer liability. This article suggests that issuer liability could potentially 
have a stronger deterrent effect when it shifts risk to individuals or entities holding 
a larger financial stake. Thus, it would enlist large shareholders in monitoring in 
much of Europe. The same risk-shifting effect also has implications for the debate 
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about the relationship between securities litigation and creditor interests. Credi-
tors’ claims should not be given precedence over claims of defrauded investors 
(e.g., because of the capital maintenance principle), since bearing some of the 
fraud risk will more strongly incentivise large creditors, such as banks, to monitor 
the firm in jurisdictions where corporate debt is relatively concentrated. 
Keywords: issuer liability, securities law, securities class action, dispersed owner-
ship, concentrated ownership, capital maintenance, fraud risk, compensation, 
deterrence, prospectus liability. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Securities law has, without doubt, become an important field in many European 
countries during the past two decades. In a development traced by scholars analys-
ing convergence in corporate governance, formerly dormant markets across the 
Continent have experienced growth, and the concerns of shareholders have again 
become important in the public discussion. The motherland of securities law is of 
course the United States, whose model has been very influential, in particular with 
respect to the creation of capital markets regulators following the model of the SEC 
as an independent regulatory agency. Arguably, the other core element of US 
securities law is the securities class action, most of all under SEC Rule 10b-5, 
which was made possible by the development of a ‘private right of action’ by the 
courts.1 The social value of securities class actions in the US is, however, deeply 
controversial. While economists such as La Porta, et al. have identified the effec-
tiveness of private enforcement of securities law as a strong predictor of capital 
market development in cross-country regression studies,2 many legal commentators 
in the US believe that securities class actions serve no useful purpose, in part for 
reasons that are explored in this article. 
Civil liability for misinformation in the capital markets has already appeared on 
the radar of EU law. Art. 6(1) of the Prospectus Directive.3 requires that Member 
                                                                                                                                                       
1 Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D.Pa. 1946) (first case establishing a 
private right of action for injured investors). 
2 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘What Works in Securities 
Law?’, 61 Journal of Finance (2006) p. 1; but see Howell Jackson and Mark J. Roe, ‘Public and 
Private Enforcement of Securities Laws: Resource-based Evidence’, 93 Journal of Financial 
Economics (2009) p. 207 (including additional variables in La Porta, et al.’s data and finding that the 
strength of public enforcement is more important); see also Mathias M. Siems, ‘What Does Not 
Work in Securities Law: A Critique on La Porta, et al.’s Methodology’, 16 International Company 
and Commercial Law Review (2005) p. 300 (criticising La Porta, et al.’s way of coding law). 
3 Directive 2003/71/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 4 November 2003 
on the prospectus to be published when securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading 
and amending Directive 2001/34/EC, OJ 2004 L 345/64. 
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States provide liability of either ‘the issuer or its administrative, management or 
supervisory bodies, the offeror, the person asking for the admission to trading on a 
regulated market or the guarantor, as the case may be’. Similarly, Art. 7 of the 
Transparency Directive.4 requires that ‘responsibility … lies at least with the issuer 
or its administrative, management or supervisory bodies’. In short, as a minimum 
standard, Member States must hold either the issuing company or individuals that 
are responsible for misstatements liable. 
The choice embodied in the Directives closely relates to the objective of this ar-
ticle, namely to explore how the ‘fraud risk’ created by misstatements is allocated 
among misled investors, other shareholders and creditors of the firm, and the 
responsible individuals, and how it consequently sets incentives to prevent securi-
ties fraud. Specifically, I investigate how the incentive effects of issuer liability 
depend on the company’s capital structure, which – at least to my knowledge – has 
not been done before in the literature. The core objective is to show that, in Europe, 
effective issuer liability could indeed have a useful social purpose. This argument 
may be somewhat surprising to those not familiar with theoretical debates about 
securities law, as it stands in sharp contrast to the debate in the US. Most scholars 
have concluded that the social benefits of issuer liability (if there are any) are 
highly dubious, given that it does not provide adequate deterrence and has highly 
problematic redistributive effects.5 In the European context, I diverge from the 
assessment of US securities law with respect to the potential effectiveness of civil 
liability, particularly the issuing corporation’s liability. I argue that the scathing 
criticism of issuer liability and its inability to deter rests on the assumption of a 
diffuse ownership structure, which is thought to be typical of publicly traded firms 
in the US.6 By contrast, many publicly traded firms in Continental Europe, as in 
much of the rest of the world, have at least some large shareholders who hold 
significant blocks of stock. I suggest that issuer liability could be used to enlist 
large shareholders to monitor management in order to reduce fraud risk. Blockhold-
ers should be both capable of and interested in preventing fraud, and in effective 
insurance plans. The reason is that issuer liability shifts a significant portion of the 
                                                                                                                                                       
4 Directive 2004/109/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 
2004 on the harmonisation of transparency requirements in relation to information about issuers 
whose securities are admitted to trading on a regulated market and amending Directive 
2001/34/EC, 2004 OJ L 390/38. 
5 E.g., William W. Bratton and Michael L. Wachter, ‘The Political Economy of Fraud on the 
Market’, 160 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2011) p. 69, at p. 72 (‘The fraud-on-the-
market (FOTM) cause of action just doesn’t work. At least that is the consensus view among 
academics respecting the primary class action vehicle under the federal securities laws’). 
6 See John Armour, Henry Hansmann and Reinier Kraakman, ‘What is Corporate Law?’, in 
Reinier Kraakman, et al., The Anatomy of Corporate Law, 2nd edn. (Oxford University Press 
2009) p. 1, at pp. 29-32 (surveying patterns of corporate ownership). 
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fraud risk onto blockholders because their share in the company loses significant 
value from the payout after a judgment or settlement. 
The risk-shifting effect of issuer liability also has implications for the debate on 
the extent to which creditors’ claims should enjoy precedence over shareholders’ 
claims for securities fraud.7 In several European countries, it has been debated 
whether the capital maintenance doctrine should preclude or limit issuer liability to 
shareholders. Recently, the ECJ has been asked to clarify the position of secondary 
EU law on that issue.8 I argue that, as a matter of policy, creditor interests should 
not be given priority. In Europe, corporate debt is also more concentrated than in 
the US, with bank lending being relatively more important compared to bond 
issues, the implication being that fraud risk would also marginally increase banks’ 
incentives to monitor. 
Thus, at a time when US law is, if anything, retrenching from private securities 
litigation vis-à-vis foreign issuers,9 European jurisdictions may be well advised to 
harness its power. There are significant hurdles that currently make it more difficult 
to hold an issuer responsible than in the US. While some legislatures have ex-
panded private litigation in recent years, they might have to think about further 
steps in this direction. 
This article proceeds as follows: section 2 builds on the narrative dominating the 
US debate and explains why compensation cannot be the purpose of issuer liability 
and why it also appears not to exert a meaningful deterrent effect in the US. Section 
3 discusses how issuer liability re-allocates fraud risk and imposes it on different 
groups of shareholders, and how it creates incentives for them to avoid capital 
market fraud. I suggest that the critique developed in the US holds only against the 
backdrop of dispersed ownership, which is why it does not fully apply in Europe. 
Section 4 looks at how issuer liability allocates fraud risk between different groups 
of shareholders and creditors and how it can strengthen the role of creditors as 
monitors. Section 5 suggests that a stronger enforcement mechanism may be 
needed in Europe to create a meaningful deterrent effect, but there are still consid-
erable hurdles to overcome in the political economy of corporate governance. 
Section 6 concludes. 
                                                                                                                                                       
7 In the US, Bankruptcy Code § 510(b) subordinates claims by investors under securities law 
to those of creditors. Infra section 4.1. 
8 A case is currently pending before the ECJ, submitted by the Vienna Commercial Court. 
HG Wien, 26 March 2012, 51 Cg 243/11h, Der Gesellschafter (GesRZ) (2012) p. 196; ECJ Case 
C-174/12, Hirmann v. Immofinanz, Opinion of the Attorney General delivered on 12 September 
2013. 
9 Morrison v. National Australia Bank, 130 S.Ct 2869 (2010) (limiting the application of 
§ 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act to transactions taking place in the US); see, e.g., Yuliya 
Guseva, ‘Cross-Listings and the New World of International Capital: Another Look at the 
Efficiency and Extraterritoriality of Securities Law’, 44 Georgetown Journal of International 
Law (2013) p. 411, at pp. 442-451. 
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2. THE CRITIQUE OF SECURITIES LITIGATION 
2.1 Compensation and circularity 
As is the case for other forms of liability, liability for false capital market informa-
tion could serve two possible functions: compensation and deterrence. In economic 
terms, the purpose of compensating a victim is to assign risk to a good risk bearer.10 
If risk-averse individuals are exposed to potential harm, their ex ante decrease in 
utility from exposure to risk will be reduced by the expectation of compensation. In 
other words, from the plaintiff.’s perspective the function of liability is akin to that 
of insurance.11 A compensation rationale for tort law is problematic because insur-
ance markets are highly developed and insurance is widely available today, other 
than during the formative period of modern civil law doctrine.12 
But even if we accept a compensation rationale for tort law in general, the trans-
fer of funds by means of compensation is particularly troublesome in the case of 
issuer liability.13 because of three aspects of circularity: pocket-shifting, investor 
diversification, and redistribution between different classes of investors. 
First, pocket-shifting arises because a judgment or payment made in settlement 
to the plaintiff investors in a securities lawsuit is typically paid by the issuing 
corporation.14 Consequently, the value of its shares decreases by the same amount.15 
                                                                                                                                                       
10  E.g., Steven Shavell, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Belknap Press of Harvard 
University Press 2004), at pp. 257-258. 
11  In the absence of tort law, a risk-averse potential claimant could eliminate risk by taking 
out insurance. E.g., Shavell, idem, at p. 268. To some extent, this raises the distributive question 
of which party can get insurance for a lower price. See, e.g., Gerhard Wagner, 5 Münchener 
Kommentar zum BGB, 5th edn. (C.H. Beck 2009), Vor § 823, ¶54-55 (pointing out this distribu-
tive consequence of tort law). 
12  Shavell, idem, at pp. 268-269 (discussing the ‘development of insurance markets in the 
latter part of the nineteenth century’); see also Jean-Sébastian Borghetti, ‘The Culture of Tort 
Law in France’, 3 Journal of European Tort Law (2012) p. 158, at p. 164 (pointing out that both 
the French social security system and private insurance provide compensation). 
13  Amanda M. Rose, ‘Reforming Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship 
between Public and Private Enforcement of Rule 10b-5’, 108 Columbia Law Review (2008) p. 1301, 
at pp. 1302-1303 (‘Most commentators now agree that the private right of action implied under 
Section 10(b) … cannot be defended on compensatory grounds’); but see James D. Cox, ‘Making 
Securities Fraud Actions Virtuous’, 39 Arizona Law Review (1997) p. 497, at pp. 509-515. 
14  The issuer may be vicariously liable under general principles of respondeat superior, as in 
the US, or because of explicit statutory rules implementing the options of Art. 6(1) of the Pro-
spectus Directive and Art. 7 of the Transparency Directive. Directors and officers responsible for 
the misstatements typically do not have the deep pockets to be attractive defendants, even though 
they personally likely benefited from them. In Germany, the equivalent is § 31 BGB. 
15  This assumes – realistically – that the corporation is unable or unwilling to seek reim-
bursement from individuals responsible for misinformation. But see, e.g., Theodor Baums, 
‘Haftung wegen Falschinformation des Sekundärmarkts’, 167 Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- 
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In typical ‘secondary market’ cases, where plaintiffs bought shares at an inflated 
price, the corporation does not even benefit through the payment received for a 
share issue.16 Thus, issuer liability shifts the ‘fraud risk’ from the buyers to the 
corporation and, consequently, to its entire body of shareholders pro rata.17 
Diffusing risk to a larger group is the essential role of insurance and would at 
first glance seem beneficial.18 However, given that the composition of the body of 
shareholders is fluid, issuer liability has redistributive effects. First, the beneficiar-
ies of the fraud, namely shareholders who sold at an inflated price (regardless of 
whether they knew that the market price did not reflect the true value), do not bear 
any of the cost of the remedy.19 By contrast, the defrauded shareholders partly 
finance their own remedy. This is obviously true if they still retain their shares, 
which will lose value. If they no longer hold the shares, they probably suffered 
additional harm because the market price at the time of the sale already anticipated 
the results of the lawsuit. Part of the fraud risk is dumped on innocent shareholders 
who simply held on to their shares. For these as well, insult is added to injury, since 
they not only suffer financially from the remedy,20 but also have to bear the loss of 
the firm’s value due to the reputational fallout from the exposure of fraud.21 
                                                                                                                                                       
und Wirtschaftsrecht (2003) p. 139, at p. 167 (defending issuer liability against the circularity 
argument because it is only persuasive if board members are ultimately not held liable). 
16  Donald C. Langevoort, ‘Capping Damages for Open-Market Securities Fraud’, 38 Arizona 
Law Review (1996) p. 646; John C. Coffee Jr, ‘Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on 
Deterrence and Its Implementation’, 106 Columbia Law Review (2006) p. 1534, at p. 1556; James J. 
Park, ‘Shareholder Compensation as Dividend’, 108 Michigan Law Review (2009) p. 323, at p. 331; 
Merritt B. Fox, ‘Why Civil Liability for Disclosure Violations When Issuers Do Not Trade?’, 
Wisconsin Law Review (2009) p. 297, at p. 302; Bratton and Wachter, supra n. 5, at p. 94. 
17  Fox, idem, at p. 303, in footnote 6, suggests that the injury is spread across the sharehold-
ers of the firm at the time when the suit is filed. Obviously, shares can be bought and sold 
between the filing and the payment of damages. However, from the time of the discovery of the 
fraud, the market price should in theory capture the risk of a possible payment to the plaintiffs. 
See also Paul Davies, ‘Liability for Misstatements to the Market: Some Reflections’, 9 Journal of 
Corporate Law Studies (2009) p. 295, at pp. 299-300. 
18  Fox, idem, at pp. 304-305; Langevoort, supra n. 16, at p. 649. 
19  Coffee, supra n. 16, at pp. 1557-1558. Indirectly, the sellers may have contributed to the 
remedy because the firm paid insurance premia. 
20  Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, ‘Optimal Damages in Securities Cases’, 52 
University of Chicago Law Review (1985) p. 611, at p. 639; Park, supra n. 16, at p. 332. See also 
Jill E. Fisch, ‘Confronting the Circularity Problem in Private Securities Regulation’, Wisconsin 
Law Review (2009) p. 333, at p. 344 (pointing out that these shareholders were also affected by 
the fraud because they missed out on information that would have been useful to discipline 
management). 
21  Park, supra n. 16, at p. 330; see also Richard A. Booth, ‘The Future of Securities Litiga-
tion’, 4 Journal of Business & Technology Law (2009) p. 129, at p. 140. The reputational loss 
may exceed the actual payment by far and develop as the consequence of public scrutiny inde-
pendently of a suit. E.g., Amanda M. Rose and Richard Squire, ‘Intraportfolio Litigation’, 105 
Northwestern University Law Review (2011) p. 1679, at p. 1703 (referring to the empirical 
literature). 
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Second, the diversification of many investors implies that they do not benefit 
from the prospect of compensation ex ante. A diversified investor will sometimes 
be a member of the plaintiff class gaining from a securities class action, and some-
times a holding shareholder who loses.22 It is often argued that the law does not 
need to protect investors who could have avoided the utility loss by diversifying.23 
Diversification thus allows investors to self-insure, rendering liability superfluous.24 
However, it is argued that non-diversified investors serve an important function in 
the market and thus should be protected from fraud risk. This would include infor-
mation traders, whose research pushes stock prices to better reflect the intrinsic 
value of firms,25 as well as potential acquirers planning a hostile takeover.26 
Third, redistributive effects of compensation are probably the most damning ar-
gument against issuer liability. To avoid overall losses from fraud, an investor not 
only has to be diversified, but also needs to both sell and purchase stock equally 
often. Retail investors typically tend to buy and hold their shares over an extended 
period, which is why they do not enjoy the risk reduction benefits of frequent 
                                                                                                                                                       
22  Park, supra n. 16, at pp. 328-329; see also Janet Cooper Alexander, ‘Rethinking Damages 
in Securities Class Actions’, 48 Stanford Law Review (1996) p. 1487, at p. 1502; Fox, supra n. 
16, at pp. 307-308; Fisch, supra n. 20, at p. 337; Booth, supra n. 21, at p. 139; Davies, supra n. 
17, at p. 300; cf. in Germany, Alexander Hellgardt, Kapitalmarktdeliktsrecht (Mohr Siebeck 
2008), at p. 141; but see Thomas M.J. Möllers, ‘Efficiency as a Standard in Capital Market Law – 
The Application of Empirical and Economic Arguments for the Justification of Civil Law, 
Criminal Law and Administrative Law Sanctions’, 20 European Business Law Review (2009) p. 
243, at p. 265 (rejecting the argument on grounds of ‘equalising justice’). See Coffee, supra n. 16, 
at p. 1558 (giving the example of a pension fund with stakes in 1000 corporations, 100 of which 
are sued over a certain time period, where the fund is a plaintiff in 50 cases and a holding share-
holder in the other 50). 
23  Fox, supra n. 16, at p. 307; Bratton and Wachter, supra n. 5, at pp. 94-96. An empirical 
study commissioned by the US Chamber of Commerce seems to confirm the diversification 
argument for institutional investors, see Anjan V. Thakor, Jeffrey S. Nielsen and David A. 
Gullay, ‘The Economic Reality of Securities Class Action Regulation’ (2005), at pp. 13-15 
(suggesting that profits and losses approximately balance for institutional investors, that securities 
class actions often result in overcompensation, and that losses from fraud risk are small compared 
to other losses). But see James D. Cox and Randall S. Thomas, ‘Mapping the American Share-
holder Litigation Experience: A Survey of Empirical Studies of the Enforcement of the U.S. 
Securities Law’, 6 European Company and Financial Law Review (2009) p. 180, n. 42 (criticis-
ing the lack of disclosure of the identity of the firms included in the Thakor, et al. study). 
24  Booth, supra n. 21, at pp. 139-140; Richard A. Booth, ‘The End of Securities Fraud as We 
Know It’, 4 Berkeley Business Law Journal (2007) p. 1, at p. 17. 
25  Park, supra n. 16, at pp. 342-344; see also Fisch, supra n. 20, at p. 347; but see Booth, 
idem, at p. 16 (contending that information traders often have widely spread portfolios); Cox and 
Thomas, supra n. 23, at pp. 176-177 (discussing hedge funds). 
26  E.g., Booth, supra n. 24, at pp. 14-15. Moreover, some shareholders are not able to diver-
sify, most of all employees who are contractually obligated to retain their employer’s shares for a 
certain period. Booth, idem, at p. 15; Cox and Thomas, supra n. 23, at p. 176. Retail investors 
may not always be able to adequately diversify. See, e.g., Alicia Davis Evans, ‘The Investor 
Compensation Fund’, 33 Journal of Corporation Law (2007) p. 223, at pp. 234-236. 
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trades.27 Moreover, ‘buy and hold’ investors are more likely to be among the ‘inno-
cent’ holding shareholders whose shares lose value because of a judgment or 
settlement than in the plaintiff class of buying shareholders, given that they adjust 
their portfolio less often than institutional investors.28 Consequently, the effects of 
issuer liability on different groups are reversed: badly diversified groups of share-
holders, for which compensation as such would be more valuable, are more likely 
to suffer, whereas diversified institutional investors, for whom compensation is 
unimportant, are more likely to gain.29 In other words, issuer liability redistributes 
from unsophisticated retail investors to sophisticated institutional investors.30 
2.2 Mismatch between plaintiffs’ losses and the social cost of fraud 
If compensation cannot provide a persuasive explanation for issuer liability, the 
objective must be deterrence of capital market fraud. Independently of the distribu-
tion of risk, liability should therefore reduce fraud risk and thus reduce capital cost 
for firms.31 However, under the prevailing view, it fails at that task as well. One 
major issue is that it does not create sanctions corresponding to the harm created by 
securities fraud in order to incentivise actors to take appropriate care, which the 
basic law and economics model of issuer liability would normally postulate.32 
                                                                                                                                                       
27  Evans, idem, at pp. 232-234. But see Alicia J. Davis, ‘Are Investors’ Gains and Losses 
from Securities Fraud Equal over Time? Theory and Evidence’, University of Michigan Law 
School Empirical Legal Studies Center Working Paper No. 09-002 (10/2010), available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=1121198> (suggesting, based on a simulation study, that, while the 
average results for institutional investors are neutral, there is considerable variance between the 
outcomes for specific institutional investors). 
28  Langevoort, supra n. 16, at pp. 649-650; Coffee, supra n. 16, at pp. 1559-1560; Bratton 
and Wachter, supra n. 5, at p. 97. In the US, almost all buyers are typically members of the 
plaintiff class because of the opt-out model of the class action. 
The adverse consequences described above seem to be hard to avert for retail investors, who 
typically pay higher fees for trading than institutional investors and also suffer more from infor-
mation asymmetry in the stock market. Coffee, supra n. 16, at p. 1560. The problem seems even 
greater for employees who are required to hold on to their shares. Booth, supra n. 24, at p. 15. 
29  E.g., Booth, supra n. 21, at p. 147; Alexander, supra n. 22, at p. 1502; see also Fox, supra 
n. 16, at p. 304 (pointing out that ‘holding’ shareholders will typically not be more diversified 
than plaintiffs, which is why compensation does not result in a better distribution of risk). 
30  A possible objection is that compensation may be required to encourage information trad-
ers to invest and to do research that enhances market efficiency. Arguably, the objective of 
securities regulation is to facilitate competitive trading by such market participants. See, gener-
ally, Zohar Goshen and Gideon Parchomovsky, ‘The Essential Role of Securities Regulation’, 55 
Duke Law Journal (2006) p. 711. 
31  But see Georg Eckert, ‘Emittentenhaftung für fehlerhafte Kapitalmarktinformation und 
aktienrechtliche Kapitalerhaltung’, GesRZ (2010) p. 88, at p. 95 (correctly pointing out that 
liability redistributes risk between shareholders because of circularity, but disregarding the risk-
reducing deterrence effect). 
32  Regarding the appropriate level of damages to internalise social cost, see, e.g., Shavell, 
supra n. 10, at p. 178. Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics, 3rd edn. (Addison 
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Adjusting penalties to the socially optimal level therefore normally requires them to 
be tied to the harmful act’s social cost.33 In plain vanilla tort cases, social cost 
typically is identical to the harm incurred by the plaintiff. However, this is not the 
case in securities cases. While investors can sue for the difference between the 
actual purchase price of the shares and the hypothetical price after adjusting for the 
false information,34 this has nothing to do with social harm. While the plaintiff 
clearly lost some money, there are always beneficiaries who gained precisely that 
amount, namely those who sold stock at an inflated price. Looking only at this 
redistributive effect, there would be no social cost and therefore no reason to pro-
hibit securities fraud.35 
Securities fraud, however, creates at least five types of social costs that all entail 
a misallocation of resources.36 First, the corporation perpetrating the fraud often 
incurs expenses to hide it,37 while some shareholders may feel compelled to monitor 
                                                                                                                                                       
Wesley Longman 2000), at pp. 300-302; Robert Cooter, ‘Prices and Sanctions’, 84 Columbia 
Law Review (1984) p. 1523, at p. 1532; A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, ‘Punitive 
Damages: An Economic Analysis’, 111 Harvard Law Review (1998) p. 869, at pp. 874 and 887-
896. Traditional Continental scholars sometimes argue that deterrence cannot be the objective of 
tort law, given that a damages payment will deter all harm. E.g., Helmut Koziol, Basic Questions 
of Tort Law from a Germanic Perspective (Jan Sramek Verlag 2013), ¶3/5. This is not persuasive 
because economic analysis does not even purport to strive for complete deterrence. 
33  E.g., Hellgardt, supra n. 22, at p. 366; Amanda M. Rose, ‘The Multienforcer Approach to 
Securities Fraud Deterrence: A Critical Analysis’, 158 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 
(2010) p. 2173, at pp. 2188-2189 (discussing the issue in the context of securities markets). 
34  For a comparative overview, see Klaus J. Hopt and Hans-Christoph Voigt, ‘Grundsatz- und 
Reformprobleme der Prospekt- und Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung’, in Klaus J. Hopt and 
Hans-Christoph Voigt, eds., Prospekt- und Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung (Mohr Siebeck 
2005) p. 9, at pp. 86-89. 
35  E.g. Richard A. Posner, ‘Law and the Theory of Finance: Some Intersections’, 54 George 
Washington Law Review (1986) p. 159, at pp. 169-170; Paul G. Mahoney, ‘Precaution Cost and 
the Law of Fraud in Impersonal Markets’, 78 Virginia Law Review (1992) p. 623, at pp. 629-630; 
Fox, supra n. 16, at p. 302; Hopt and Voigt, supra n. 34, at p. 56; Thomas M.J. Möllers and Franz 
Clemens Leisch, in Kölner Kommentar zum WpHG (Carl Heymanns 2007) § 37b, c ¶274; 
Hellgardt, supra n. 22, at pp. 140-141 (all discussing the secondary market); Marcel Kahan, 
‘Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices’, 41 Duke Law Journal (1992) 
p. 977, at pp. 1006-1007. 
36  Andreas Schönenberger, Ökonomische Analyse der Notwendigkeit und Effizienz des 
börsengesetzlichen Haftungsregimes (Nomos-Universitätsschriften 2000), at pp. 106-107. 
Similarly, the social harm of theft is not the loss of utility for the victim (which may be compen-
sated or even exceeded by the gain in utility for the thief.), but the cost incurred by private parties 
to prevent theft, and maybe more importantly, the erosion of the function of ownership as a legal 
institution. In the absence of secure property rights, owners have fewer or no incentives to invest 
in assets under their control. See Shavell, supra n. 10, at p. 12 (discussing reduced incentives to 
invest in the absence of property rights); Dean Lueck and Thomas J. Miceli, ‘Property Law’, in 
A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, eds., Handbook of Law and Economics, Vol. 1 (Elsevier 
2007) p. 184, at p. 229 (discussing the ‘efficient theft’ argument and the social cost of theft). 
37  Posner, supra n. 35, at p. 170; Easterbrook and Fischel, supra n. 20, at p. 623; Mahoney, 
supra n. 35, at p. 631. 
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more closely – and therefore have higher expenses – than in the absence of fraud 
risk.38 Second, in the case of a new stock issue, incorrect share prices will lead to a 
misallocation of scarce capital, since investment will be directed toward issuers of 
overvalued shares.39 Third, even when the issuer does not trade, fraud risk increases 
volatility and therefore reduces utility for risk-averse investors.40 Since this risk 
affects all traded firms and cannot be eliminated through diversification, investors 
will expect higher risk premia.41 Fourth, misinformation can affect the agency 
relationship between shareholders and managers, and specifically increase agency 
cost by undermining the price mechanism as a means for principals to monitor their 
agents.42 Managers producing seemingly good financial results will be viewed more 
favourably than they should be by all markets in which they operate, including the 
managerial labour market,43 the executive compensation market.44 and the takeover 
market.45 Fifth, securities fraud also affects other groups besides shareholders. As 
long as a firm’s business situation appears good, managers may act accordingly, 
and expand the firm, offer low prices to consumers and hire more personnel.46 
Various ‘stakeholders’ of the firm may take individually disadvantageous decisions, 
such as creditors, who will be more likely to lend to the firm on favourable terms, 
as well as employees planning their career.47 Velikonja suggests that the effects on 
employees (who may have foregone alternative career opportunities) are often 
severe, since human capital cannot be diversified like financial capital.48 
                                                                                                                                                       
38  Posner, supra n. 35; Easterbrook and Fischel, supra n. 20; Mahoney, supra n. 35, at pp. 
629-630; Hellgardt, supra n. 22, at p. 142; see also Rose, supra n. 33, at p. 2179 (discussing the 
possibility to get information from other sources); Evans, supra n. 26, at p. 231 (pointing out that 
institutional investors spend considerable time analysing financial information, which may not be 
completely rational given their high degree of diversification); Davis, supra n. 27. 
39  Easterbrook and Fischel, supra n. 20, at pp. 623-624; Kahan, supra n. 35, at pp. 1006-
1007; see also Easterbrook and Fischel, idem, at pp. 624-625 (noting that false information can 
induce investors to underestimate risk and thus lower risk premia); Kahan, idem, at p. 1013; 
Mahoney, supra n. 35, at pp. 633-634 (both noting that these effects only apply when firms issue 
new shares). 
40  Posner, supra n. 35, at p. 170; see also Kahan, supra n. 35, at pp. 1026-1027; Hellgardt, 
supra n. 22, at p. 142. 
41  Rose, supra n. 33, at p. 2179. 
42  Mahoney, supra n. 35, at p. 634; Rose, supra n. 33, at p. 2179. 
43  See Cox, supra n. 13, at p. 510; Coffee, supra n. 16, at p. 1562; Jennifer H. Arlen and Wil-
liam J. Carney, ‘Vicarious Liability for Fraud on Securities Market: Theory and Evidence’, 
University of Illinois Law Review (1992) p. 691, at pp. 702-703 and 720-734 (lending empirical 
support to this thesis). 
44  Rose, supra n. 33, at p. 2182; see also Coffee, supra n. 16, at pp. 1572-1573 (pointing out 
managers’ incentives to front-load profits in order to gain from high stock prices). 
45  Kahan, supra n. 35, at pp. 1035-1037; Mahoney, supra n. 35, at p. 634. 
46  Urska Velikonja, ‘The Cost of Securities Fraud’, 54 William and Mary Law Review (2013) 
p. 1887, at pp. 1915-1929. 
47  Velikonja, idem, at pp. 1916-1923. 
48  Velikonja, idem, at p. 1919. 
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2.3 Insufficient incentives for deterrence 
The bottom line from the mismatch between social cost and the plaintiffs’ injury is 
that compensation as such sets the theoretically correct incentives to deter, since the 
sanction would have to correspond to the five types of social cost discussed in the 
preceding section. Since the amount of the claim has nothing to do with the social 
cost, it is clear that the purpose of liability cannot be to further the individual 
interests of the plaintiff; it must be deterrence, whose objective is to enhance the 
functioning of the securities market. Nevertheless, in the US, it is disputed whether 
securities class actions create under- or overdeterrence.49 
Some authors argue that the personal losses incurred by plaintiff shareholders 
are likely much larger than the losses in social welfare.50 Others argue that disclo-
sure of false information is always socially harmful and should be deterred com-
pletely.51 In the end, overdeterrence is not particularly plausible. First, false and 
misleading information is not normally published primarily to benefit the company, 
but usually because managers expect personal advantages,52 in particular when they 
are facing a last-period problem and are trying to avoid a nearly inevitable collapse 
of the firm.53 Possible benefits to the company tend to be incidental. 
Second, it is unlikely that firms overspend trying to ascertain the accuracy of 
their disclosures. Since firms typically employ professionals already (e.g., account-
ants), it is not difficult for managers to determine whether disclosures are truthful.54 
                                                                                                                                                       
49  Overdeterrence would mean that firms might spend excessive resources (e.g., legal fees) 
on trying to avoid violations of securities law. Rose, supra n. 33, at pp. 2190, 2192 and 2194; 
Langevoort, supra n. 16, at p. 652. Moreover, it would make it impossible for firms to make a 
reasonable judgment of whether keeping certain information confidential or disclosing it to the 
public is more advantageous. See Alexander, supra n. 22, at pp. 1499-1500; Mahoney, supra n. 
35, at p. 635. 
50  Easterbrook and Fischel, supra n. 20, at p. 625; Alexander, supra n. 22, at pp. 1497-1498 
(estimating that the social cost amounts to approximately 9% of plaintiff investors’ losses and 
interpreting much lower settlement values as indicating lower social cost); Langevoort, supra n. 
16, at pp. 646-647; Schönenberger, supra n. 36, at pp. 110 and 118-119 (using a model to esti-
mate that investors’ losses correspond to approximately 400 times the amount of allocative 
losses); but see Goshen and Parchomovsky, supra n. 30, at p. 775 (suggesting that all trading 
shareholders must be compensated to achieve sufficient deterrence since not all information 
traders will buy or sell); Hellgardt, supra n. 22, at p. 385. 
51  E.g., Arlen and Carney, supra n. 43, at pp. 692 and 718; Urska Velikonja, ‘Leverage, 
Sanctions, and Deterrence of Accounting Fraud’, 44 UC Davis Law Review (2011) p. 1281, at p. 
1340 (‘there is no social value in aggressive accounting’). 
52  E.g., Coffee, supra n. 16, at p. 1562 (suggesting that managers are interested in securing 
their position and maximising compensation); Fox, supra n. 16, at p. 280. 
53  Arlen and Carney, supra n. 43, at pp. 715 and 725; Cox, supra n. 13, at p. 510; 
Langevoort, supra n. 16, at p. 654. 
54  Velikonja, supra n. 51, at p. 1340; but see Davies, supra n. 17, at pp. 301-304 (suggesting 
that liability may overdeter if a negligence standard applies, which may discourage voluntary 
disclosures). 
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Third, to have a deterrent effect, the person facing liability must actually be in 
control of the firm, i.e., managers have to be personally liable.55 Normally, the 
defendant in a securities case is the issuer because of its deeper pockets. Individuals 
are rarely held personally liable.56 and typically only contribute to settlements 
financially when the corporation is insolvent, when there is no insurance coverage, 
or when they agree to do so to avoid criminal prosecution.57 
Fourth, and most importantly, directors and officers (D&O) insurance all but 
eliminates incentives that might create a deterrent effect.58 Since the late 1990s, 
D&O insurance in the US typically covers both individual and issuer liability 
(including litigation cost).59 Insurance extinguishes not only the remaining deterrent 
effect on potentially liable individuals, who no longer face a possible monetary 
sanction,60 but any incentive for shareholders to better select directors to avoid 
misrepresentations to the capital market in the first place. 
In theory, insurers should want to avoid liability, which is why they will either 
monitor the insured or create incentives for directors and officers to avoid liability 
cases, e.g., through risk-adjusted insurance premia or deductibles. Insurance should 
theoretically have the advantage of avoiding the collective action problem that im-
pedes monitoring by shareholders in a corporation with dispersed ownership.61 How-
ever, empirical research by Baker and Griffith shows that securities claims in the US 
                                                                                                                                                       
55  Langevoort, supra n. 16, at p. 653. Jurisdictions differ with respect to how easily they al-
low plaintiffs to hold individuals liable. For the US, see Securities Act § 11(a) (holding various 
individuals liable, including managers and signatories of the registration statement); Securities 
Exchange Act § 20(a) (providing for liability of ‘controlling persons’). By contrast, the equivalent 
German statutes (§ 21 WpPG, §§ 37b, 37b WpHG) do not explicitly provide for a direct liability 
of individuals to investors, which is why claims, if possible at all, have to be based on general 
civil law. See Wolfgang Gross, Kapitalmarktrecht, 5th edn. (C.H. Beck 2012) § 21 WpPG ¶35. 
For the very similar Austrian situation under § 11 KMG, see Friedrich Rüffler, ‘Organaußen-
haftung für Anlegerschäden’, 133 Juristische Blätter (JBl) (2011) p. 69; for a comparative over-
view, see Hopt and Voigt, supra n. 34, at pp. 120-121. 
56  Alexander, supra n. 22, at p. 1499; Coffee, supra n. 16, at p. 1551; Fisch, supra n. 20, at p. 
337; Bernard Black, Brian Cheffins and Michael Klausner, ‘Outside Director Liability’, 58 
Stanford Law Review (2006) p. 1055, at pp. 1068-1074 (noting that, since 1980, there have only 
been cases of securities class actions where directors were personally held liable). 
57  Coffee, supra n. 16, at p. 1551; see also Alexander, supra n. 22, at p. 1498. But see Davies, 
supra n. 17, at p. 301 (suggesting that reputational effects of lawsuits may deter wrongdoing); 
Amanda M. Rose, ‘Better Bounty Hunting: How the SEC’s New Whistleblower Program 
Changes the Securities Fraud Class Action Debate’, Vanderbilt University Law School Public 
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper 13-34 (2013), at p. 18 (suggesting that personal stock 
ownership and possible reputational losses may incentivise directors to avoid fraud). 
58  D&O insurance is typically bought by the corporation. 
59  Coffee, supra n. 16, at p. 1570 (suggesting that 90% of issuers were covered in 2002). See 
also Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, Ensuring Corporate Misconduct (University of Chicago 
Press 2010), at p. 46. 
60  Baker and Griffith, idem, at pp. 60-61. 
61  Cf. Arlen and Carney, supra n. 43, at p. 712. 
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typically settle close or slightly above the limit of D&O coverage and that insurers 
make few efforts to reduce liability risk (such as monitoring or financial incentives).62 
Their main explanation is agency cost. Since managers have little reason to act in the 
interest of shareholders when taking out insurance, they choose plans that limit their 
personal exposure to liability and thus do not set the right incentives.63 
3. ISSUER LIABILITY AND SHAREHOLDERS’ INCENTIVES TO MONITOR 
3.1 Issuer liability and corporate governance 
As described in the previous section, issuer liability neither creates substantial 
social value by compensating investors, nor does it seem to incentivise management 
to avoid providing false information to the securities market. However, conceivably 
it could achieve deterrence indirectly, namely through effects on the corporation’s 
governance that reduce fraud risk. In the remainder of the paper, I investigate this 
possibility. Specifically, I argue that different financial structures make a difference 
for the effects of issuer liability and that the apparent lack of a deterrent effect in 
the US (in spite of vigorous enforcement through securities class actions) is a 
consequence of the dispersed ownership structure. 
To a certain extent, the existing literature deals with the interaction of issuer li-
ability and corporate governance. Arlen and Carney, referring to the debate on 
enterprise liability in general, suggest that corporate liability is superior to individ-
ual liability when (1) the corporation can impose greater ex post sanctions than a 
court, (2) it is better positioned to apprehend the responsible individuals than an 
outside plaintiff, or (3) when it is more capable of deterring fraud ex ante.64 They 
                                                                                                                                                       
62  See Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, ‘How the Merits Matter: Directors’ and Officers’ In-
surance and Securities Settlements’, 157 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2009) p. 755, at 
pp. 760-761. See also Fox, supra n. 16, at p. 305; Cox, supra n. 13, at p. 512 (finding that the 
settlement amount is covered by insurance in 96% of cases); Bratton and Wachter, supra n. 5, at 
p. 100; Baker and Griffith, supra n. 59, at p. 137 (providing an anecdote about directors who, 
after initially worrying about a securities lawsuit, quickly move on to lunch after learning there is 
insurance coverage). 
63  Baker and Griffith, idem, at pp. 72-74. For the corporation, it rarely makes sense to sue 
individuals for reimbursement, since this primarily results in litigation cost that uses up insurance 
coverage. Thomas E. Dubbs, ‘A Scotch Verdict on “Circularity” and Other Issues’, Wisconsin 
Law Review (2009) p. 455, at p. 462. 
64  Arlen and Carney, supra n. 43, at p. 707; see also Sharon Oded, ‘Inducing Corporate 
Compliance: A Compound Corporate Liability Regime’, 31 International Review of Law and 
Economics (2011) p. 272, at pp. 273-275 (discussing the role of corporate liability for compli-
ance; but see Reinier Kraakman, ‘Corporate Liability Strategies and the Costs of Legal Control’, 
93 Yale Law Journal (1984) p. 857, at pp. 867-888 (discussing individual liability as a back-up 
making up for insufficiency of sanctions imposed on the firm). 
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are of course correct to point out, however, that these conditions do not apply in the 
context of securities fraud: there is little reason to believe that the corporation can 
and will impose sanctions on misbehaving managers.65 While in some cases, a 
corporation may be better able to identify individuals responsible for misconduct 
than the person actually harmed, this is not the case for securities lawsuits, since 
investors can easily identify directors and officers.66 Most of all, the board of 
directors is typically not inclined to sue managers that are directly responsible for 
misrepresentations to the capital market.67 The fact that a board of directors is 
unlikely to pursue claims against its own members, or against officers that it ap-
pointed and with whom it closely collaborates, is exactly the reason why there are 
derivative actions in corporate law. The same applies to ex ante monitoring. It is of 
course true that there has been a movement to strengthen the role of independent 
board members in recent decades.68 In an ideal world, one would expect these to 
improve corporate monitoring and thus, among other things, prevent false and 
misleading reporting.69 In fact, there is some evidence suggesting that independent 
audit committees enhance the accuracy of financial reporting.70 However, other 
research suggests that directors rarely suffer a reputational penalty when letting 
financial fraud happen.71 Generally, considerable scepticism about the monitoring 
capabilities of corporate boards abounds today.72 In the context of securities litiga-
                                                                                                                                                       
65  Arlen and Carney, supra n. 43, at p. 708; see also Velikonja, supra n. 51, at p. 1308. A 
firm’s ability to punish employees (and managers) is often limited to dismissal, while private 
lawsuits are limited – like those of investors – to the employee’s assets at most (if financial 
penalties are possible at all). E.g., A. Mitchell Polinsky and Steven Shavell, ‘Should Employees 
Be Subject to Fines and Imprisonment Given the Existence of Corporate Liability?’, 13 Interna-
tional Review of Law and Economics (1993) p. 239, at p. 240; Steven Shavell, ‘The Optimal 
Level of Corporate Liability Given the Limited Ability of Corporations to Penalize Their Em-
ployees’, 17 International Review of Law and Economics (1997) p. 203, at p. 203. 
66  Arlen and Carney, supra n. 43, at p. 710. 
67  Idem, at pp. 711-712; see also Fox, supra n. 16, at p. 281 (favouring individual liability). 
68  Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices’, 59 Stanford Law Review (2007) p. 1465, at pp. 
1472-1509. 
69  Cox, supra n. 13, at pp. 511-512. 
70  Gordon, supra n. 68, at pp. 1504-1505 (summarising empirical evidence). 
71  Eric Helland, ‘Reputational Penalties and the Merits of Class-Action Securities Litigation’, 
49 Journal of Law and Economics (2006) p. 365. 
72  E.g., Donald C. Clarke, ‘Three Concepts of the Independent Director’, 32 Delaware Jour-
nal of Corporate Law (2007) p. 73, at p. 75 (‘The overall weight of the findings is that there is no 
solid evidence suggesting that independent directors improve corporate performance’); Velikonja, 
supra n. 51, at p. 1306 (‘even the best audit committees are ill equipped to catch willful account-
ing fraud’); Kelli A. Alces, ‘Beyond the Board of Directors’, 46 Wake Forest Law Review (2011) 
p. 783, pp. 796-797; Stephen M. Bainbridge and M. Todd Henderson, ‘Boards-R-Us: Reconcep-
tualizing Corporate Boards’, at pp. 20-26, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=2291065> 
(discussing problems of the board); in the context of securities violations, Langevoort, supra n. 
16, at pp. 654-655. 
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tion, the general view in the US is therefore that issuer liability does not create 
better deterrence than does individual liability.73 
One could theorise that issuer liability might create incentives to select manag-
ers more thoroughly.74 However, given that boards in large corporations are, in 
practice, often self-perpetuating bodies, the core question is whether directors have 
incentives to act in the interest of investors when selecting managers.75 The same 
applies to the implementation of internal compliance systems that might prevent the 
disclosure of false information. In this case, much depends on how well the board 
will use the information received. In those cases when fraud is most likely to be 
committed, namely when the firm is failing, managers and directors often have a 
strong incentive not to let any information leak that might cost them their jobs. 
3.2 Ownership structure and the incentive to monitor 
Directors are of course not the only possible monitor in corporate governance. As 
suggested in section 2.3, individuals are rarely held personally liable in securities 
class actions and are therefore not subject to strong incentives themselves. More-
over, the discussion of D&O insurance has illustrated the classical agency problem 
between shareholders and directors in the securities law context: shareholders might 
prefer better enforcement, but directors have no strong reason to provide it. 
Shareholders might themselves monitor to some extent, or put pressure on the 
company to appoint directors who will. Whether this is the case depends of course 
strongly on whether they have the appropriate incentives and on whether they are in 
the position to take the initiative. Ultimately, whether issuer liability has deterrent 
effects depends on the incentives it sets for shareholders whose value suffers from 
liability.76 The discussion of circularity in section 2.1 has shown that the individuals 
most likely to suffer from securities litigation (because they effectively finance the 
remedy) are ‘innocent’ buy-and-hold investors, in other words, a diffuse group of 
relatively unsophisticated individuals with typically only small stakes in the firm. 
More generally speaking, the issue is connected to the classic problem in dispersed 
ownership corporations, which predominate in the US capital markets, namely the 
separation of ownership and control. The collective action problem resulting from it 
means that shareholders’ financial interest in avoiding issuer liability is not fully 
passed on to the board of directors.77 For the individual shareholders owning a tiny 
                                                                                                                                                       
73  Coffee, supra n. 16, at p. 1564 (noting, however, that issuer liability makes litigation more 
likely). 
74  Posner, supra n. 35, at pp. 169-170. 
75  Arlen and Carney, supra n. 43, at p. 714. 
76  Cox, supra n. 13, at p. 511; Fox, supra n. 16, at p. 303, n. 6. 
77  Arlen and Carney, supra n. 43, at p. 693; see, generally, Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. 
Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’, 52 Journal of Finance (1997) p. 737, at pp. 740-
744. 
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portion of the corporation there is hardly any incentive to ensure that directors will 
be elected who will, in turn, select officers who will not commit securities fraud. 
It follows that the apparent lack of a deterrent effect of securities litigation in the 
US rests on the prevalence of dispersed ownership structures.78 Dispersed owner-
ship entails collective action problems between shareholders who otherwise might 
have stronger incentives and the capability to pre-screen directors and monitor them 
to reduce fraud risk, and who might otherwise be better able to push for more risk-
reducing D&O insurance. True, there is some debate about whether the dominance 
of dispersed ownership has been exaggerated in the literature,79 and, in fact, owner-
ship by institutional investors has increased in the past decades.80 However, the 
most important institutional investors, mutual funds, tend not to engage in share-
holder activism.81 Moreover, as the discussion of circularity has shown, institutional 
investors are more likely to be among the plaintiffs in a securities class action than 
retail investors. It therefore seems unlikely that increased institutional ownership 
will result in stronger internal monitoring against securities fraud, in particular with 
a view to the endgame situations, where it most frequently occurs. 
To summarise, we can say that the deterrent effects of issuer liability are small 
in the US because of the prevailing share ownership structures. By contrast, it is a 
staple narrative of comparative corporate governance that Continental European 
companies are often dominated by large shareholders.82 Figure 1 shows the largest 
shareholder’s voting share and the ‘stable’ shareholders’ voting share (defined as 
those known to support management) in 16 European countries and the US. In all 
                                                                                                                                                       
78  E.g., Armour, et al., supra n. 6, at p. 29 (noting the prevalence of dispersed ownership in 
the US); see also Rose and Squire, supra n. 21, at p. 1689 (noting that securities class actions can 
be better justified with deterrence if there are large, non-diversified shareholders). 
79  Clifford G. Holderness, ‘The Myth of Diffuse Ownership in the United States’, 22 Review 
of Financial Studies (2009) p. 1377 (controversially suggesting that dispersed ownership is a 
myth). 
80  E.g., Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, ‘The Agency Cost of Agency Capitalism: 
Activist Investors and the Revaluation of Governance Rights’, 113 Columbia Law Review (2013) 
p. 863, at pp. 886-888; Martin Gelter, ‘The Pension System and the Rise of Shareholder Pri-
macy’, 43 Seton Hall Law Review (2013) p. 909, at p. 954. 
81  E.g., Leo E. Strine, ‘The Delaware Way: How We Do Corporate Law and Some of the 
New Challenges We (and Europe) Face’, 30 Delaware Journal of Corporate Law (2005) p. 673, 
at p. 687 (describing mutual funds as ‘relatively docile shareholders’); see, generally, Jennifer S. 
Taub, ‘Able But Not Willing: The Failure of Mutual Fund Advisors to Advocate for Sharehold-
ers’ Rights’, 34 Journal of Corporation Law (2009) p. 843. 
82  E.g., Marco Becht and Alisa Roëll, ‘Blockholdings in Europe: An International Compari-
son’, 43 European Economic Review (1999) p. 1049; Raphael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Corporate Ownership Around the World’, 54 Journal of Finance 
(1999) p. 471; Mara Faccio and Larry H.P. Lang, ‘The Ultimate Ownership of Western European 
Corporations’, 65 Journal of Financial Economics (2002) p. 365, at pp. 379-380; Peter A. 
Gourevitch and James Shinn, Political Power and Corporate Control (Princeton University Press 
2005), at p. 18 (creating an index for concentration of stock ownership in different countries). 
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countries except the UK and the US, the largest shareholder controls a stake far in 
excess of 10%, and there is typically an even larger coalition of ‘stable’ sharehold-
ers. If anything, these data underestimate ownership concentration because the 
survey is limited to the largest firms (e.g., 40 in the US), with the effect being most 
pronounced in the larger economies. 
Figure 1: Average ownership concentration in Europe and the US in 2004.83 
 
The presence of large (often controlling) undiversified shareholders makes an 
obvious difference for the impact of issuer liability. It is well known that they 
create a tradeoff for corporations: while large shareholders are known to cause 
additional agency problems because they tend to extract private benefits of control 
if not prevented by strong corporate law, they also monitor management because it 
is in their self-interest to do so.84 First, a large shareholder owning a significant 
portion of the firm loses a significant amount of the value of its assets when the 
corporation has to make a large damages payment. The incentives to prevent mis-
                                                                                                                                                       
83  Data from Pepper D. Culpepper, Quiet Politics and Business Power (Cambridge Univer-
sity Press 2011), at pp. 31-32. The higher share of stable shareholders compared to the largest 
ones in Sweden, Finland and the US can be explained with the different sample sizes of 
Culpepper’s two surveys. I use Culpepper’s data because they seem to be the most recently 
published data. 
84  E.g., Shleifer and Vishny, supra n. 77, at p. 754; Ronald J. Gilson and Jeffrey N. Gordon, 
‘Controlling Shareholders’, 152 University of Pennsylvania Law Review (2004) p. 785, at pp. 
785-786; Alex Edmans, ‘Blockholders and Corporate Governance’ (2013), at p. 3, available at: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=2285781>. 
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conduct by management, with costly consequences, should therefore be stronger 
than for diffuse shareholders, thus overcoming the classic collective action prob-
lem. Second, in contrast to small shareholders in firms of the ‘Berle-Means’ type, 
large shareholders are in fact often capable of influencing the board and manage-
ment. ‘Core shareholders’ are not only often informally consulted before important 
transactions, but are typically also represented on the board with one or more 
confidants.85 In much of Continental Europe, a non-compliant director or officer 
would, for example, risk being removed and replaced by the firm’s large share-
holder.86 If there is single controlling shareholder, the firm may even be character-
ised by a ‘command and control’ system, in which management has little power.87 
Large shareholders thus not only monitor, but are also well positioned to influ-
ence the information policies of the corporation through the selection and removal 
of managers.88 The same applies if there are several large blockholders, who will 
often coordinate. The data on ‘stable shareholders’ typically supporting manage-
ment cited in Figure 1 suggests the prevalent presence of stable coalitions in many 
Continental European firms that can at least jointly monitor and influence the 
selection of management. Large shareholders therefore have both much better 
incentives and a higher capability to prevent capital market fraud. There are of 
course cases where controlling shareholders collusively engage in capital market 
fraud with management; John Coffee suggests that the involvement of controlling 
shareholders in financial scandals is a typical pattern of concentrated ownership 
systems.89 Whether or not a blockholder is involved in the fraud, it will suffer from 
the award or settlement and therefore have stronger incentives to either monitor or 
refrain from fraud. 
                                                                                                                                                       
85  E.g., Johannes Semler, ‘The Practice of the German Aufsichtsrat’, in Klaus J. Hopt, Hideki 
Kanda, Mark J. Roe, Eddy Wymeersch and Stefan Prigge, eds., Comparative Corporate Govern-
ance. The State of the Art and Emerging Research (Oxford University Press 1998) p. 267, at p. 
269 (describing how supervisory board members are often nominated by shareholders); Claus 
Luttermann and Jean J. du Plessis, ‘Banking on Trust: The German Financial Sector, Global 
Capital Markets and Corporate Finance and Governance’, in Jean J. du Plessis, et al., German 
Corporate Governance in International and European Context, 2nd edn. (Springer 2012) p. 329, 
at pp. 335-336 (discussing the ability of banks to control supervisory boards through ownership 
stakes). 
86  E.g., Martin Gelter, ‘The Dark Side of Shareholder Influence: Managerial Autonomy and 
Stakeholder Orientation in Comparative Corporate Governance’, 50 Harvard International Law 
Journal (2009) p. 129, at pp. 156-161, and Sofie Cools, ‘Europe’s Ius Commune on Director 
Revocability’, 8 European Company and Financial Law Review (2011) p. 199, at pp. 204-205 
(both discussing large shareholders’ ability to remove directors). 
87  John C. Coffee Jr, ‘A Theory of Corporate Scandals: Why the USA and Europe Differ’, 21 
Oxford Review of Economic Policy (2005) p. 198, at p. 204. 
88  E.g., Ronald J. Gilson, ‘Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicat-
ing the Comparative Taxonomy’, 119 Harvard Law Review (2006) p. 1641, at p. 1651. 
89  Coffee, supra n. 87, at pp. 206-207 (discussing the role of controlling shareholders in 
scandals such as Parmalat). 
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Concentrated ownership structures tend to be relatively stable; blockholders 
tend to sell their stock only in the course of a major economic rearrangement. Since 
issuer liability shifts fraud risk from the plaintiffs (usually outside investors) to 
large shareholders, it thus helps to harness their monitoring capability. Given that 
issuer liability does not require proof of the blockholder’s involvement, it always 
sets the incentive, irrespective of whether there is evidence of personal implication 
in it. It thus parallels strict liability in tort law. The implication is that in a concen-
trated ownership system the deterrent effect of issuer liability is greater, assuming 
an equal level of enforcement. 
The argument in favour of issuer liability is particularly strong in ‘primary mar-
ket’ cases, where the corporation itself sells stock and benefits from the inflated 
price. Consequently, the corporation’s old shareholders profit at the expense of the 
new ones.90 Because the remedy is often rescission,91 the redistributive effect of 
fraud is reverted so that, at least to a certain extent, the remedy even conforms to a 
compensation rationale. From a deterrence perspective, if the firm emerged from an 
IPO, the cost of issuer liability is ultimately and to a large extent borne by the 
original shareholders if they still retain shares (whose value will drop). Quite 
obviously, these are the shareholders best positioned to avoid false disclosures in 
the first place. 
3.3 Possible objections 
There are of course a number of possible objections. First, as described in section 
2.3, in the US it is arguably D&O insurance that eliminates the deterrent effects of 
issuer liability. However, ownership structure plays a core role in that argument as 
well. Critics have attributed the lack of risk reduction by insurance to agency 
problems between dispersed shareholders and directors. By contrast, a blockholder 
should be interested in having a functional insurance in place. A large shareholder 
is not automatically insured by diversification and should therefore not want the 
corporation to be excessively burdened with liability claims. It will therefore be 
interested in having an effective insurance mechanism that reduces fraud risk, since 
it will ultimately have to foot the bill for liability. 
If agency problems are ultimately to blame for the ineffectiveness of US securi-
ties class actions, could a similar argument be made against the backdrop of con-
centrated ownership? After all, there are also considerable agency problems 
                                                                                                                                                       
90  E.g., Easterbrook and Fischel, supra n. 20, at pp. 638-639; see also Coffee, supra n. 16, at 
p. 1556; Booth, supra n. 24, at p. 25. 
91  E.g., in the US, under § 12(a) of the Securities Act, the plaintiff can ‘recover the considera-
tion paid for such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income received thereon, 
upon the tender of such security, or for damages if he no longer owns the security’. 
In jurisdictions where only damages are possible, the plaintiff may ultimately bear part of the 
cost of the remedy himself if he remains a shareholder of the issuer. 
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between controlling shareholders and outside investors. A controlling shareholder 
might not favour a strong disclosure regime that reduces opportunities to obtain 
private benefits of control through tunnelling.92 Consequently, it may not be inter-
ested in insurance that actually improves monitoring in the firm, since it may 
benefit from misinforming outside investors. The obvious response is that a large 
shareholder – other than the group of managers dominating a firm with dispersed 
ownership – absorbs a large part of the cost of both high insurance premia (due to 
high fraud risk) and the reduction in the stock price resulting from a damages 
award, which managers in a dispersed ownership firm do not. According to Baker 
and Griffith, D&O insurers in the US take block ownership into account when 
calculating premia, given that ‘a controlling shareholder may be a substitute for the 
governance constraints embedded in corporate law or charters, and significant 
insider share ownership may indicate an alignment of shareholder and management 
interests’.93 
Second, one might object that corporate stock is sometimes held by other corpo-
rations, most extremely in the form of a ‘stock pyramid’ in which the ultimate 
controller of the entire corporate group holds only a small percentage of the last 
firm in the chain.94 Such a shareholder might dominate the issuer with its voting 
rights but only bear a small share of the cost of an award or settlement, the majority 
of which is financed by outside investors, which would eliminate the incentive 
effect of issuer liability. 
There are two responses. First, the difference between an individual direct 
blockholder and the controller of a stock pyramid is gradual. Empirical research 
shows that the financial stake of the controller of a pyramid approximates the 
financial stakes of a manager in a dispersed ownership firm only in rare cases.95 
                                                                                                                                                       
92  Allen Ferrell, ‘The Case for Mandatory Disclosure in Securities Regulation Around the 
World’, 2 Brooklyn Journal of Business Law (2007) p. 81, at pp. 87-92. 
93  Tom Baker and Sean J. Griffith, ‘Predicting Corporate Governance Risk: Evidence from 
the Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurance Market’, 74 University Of Chicago Law Review 
(2007) p. 487, at p. 522. 
94  E.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, Reinier Kraakman and George Triantis, ‘Stock Pyramids, 
Cross-Ownership, and Dual-Class Equity’, in Randall K. Morck, ed., Concentrated Corporate 
Ownership (University of Chicago Press 2000) p. 295, at pp. 297-301; Luca Enriques and Paolo 
Volpin, ‘Corporate Governance Reforms in Continental Europe’, 117 Journal of Economic 
Perspectives (2007) p. 117, at pp. 119-121 (discussing examples of pyramids). 
95  See, e.g., La Porta, et al, supra n. 82, at pp. 498-500 and 511 (concluding that, while pyra-
mids are common, the magnitude of deviations from the one-share-one-vote ideal tends to be 
small); Julian Franks and Colin Mayer, ‘Ownership and Control of German Corporations’, 14 
Review of Financial Studies (2001) p. 943, at pp. 950-951 (reporting an average ratio between 
voting and cash flow rights of 1.6 in a sample of 38 German firms with a pyramidal ownership 
structure); F. Jens Köke, ‘New Evidence on Ownership Structures in Germany’, 34 Kredit und 
Kapital (2001) p. 257, at pp. 280-281 (reporting that in only 10% of a sample of 5788 German 
manufacturing firms with a pyramidal structure the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights was 
less than 75%); Faccio and Lang, supra n. 82, at p. 392 (reporting mean ratios of cash flow to 
available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1566752912001280
Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Fordham Law Library, on 22 May 2019 at 19:43:36, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use,
Risk-Shifting Through Liability and Corporate Monitoring 
 
517 
Second, if firm A is at the bottom of a pyramid, a large damages award against it 
would first indirectly reduce the assets of firm B, which might, e.g., own 30% of 
A’s stock and which is controlled by X through a hierarchy of other firms. The 
award against A would likely negatively affect the financial position of B, for 
which it might become, e.g., more difficult to borrow if its assets are less valuable. 
This might also affect the reputation and personal wealth of B’s managers, who 
may therefore push for measures at the level of the issuer to avoid expensive liabil-
ity awards.96 
In practice, of course, much will depend on the individual relationship between 
X, on the one hand, and the management of B and A, on the other. Thus, it is 
probably fair to say that a pyramid structure likely mitigates the incentive effects of 
issuer liability but does not eliminate them completely. 
3.4 Transient blockholders 
A third possible objection is that this change in incentives resulting from different 
ownership structures is only effective when the controlling shareholder at the time 
when false information is publicised (when the shareholder possibly benefits from 
it) is still the same at the time when a liability payment is made (and thus there is an 
incentive effect). When a large shareholder begins to ‘unwind’ and successively 
sells several blocks of shares, thus permitting the corporation to transition into 
dispersed ownership, the remedy will set no incentive effects for the seller if the 
falsity of the information is not yet known and thus does not affect the sales price. 
Moreover, the threat of liability could conceivably create an incentive to sell all 
shares as quickly as possible before the inaccuracy of the publicised information 
has been revealed. 
Most likely, these cases reduce the social utility of issuer liability but do not 
eliminate it completely. First, a ‘departing’ large shareholder can be expected to 
absorb at least some of the liability in the sales transaction. A buyer might discover 
additional information indicating problems during a due diligence investigation and 
therefore bargain for a reduced price to adjust for the increased risk.97 If it does not, 
the selling blockholder might still be exposed to a contractual remedy if vital 
information was not made available to the buyer. 
                                                                                                                                                       
control rights between .740 and .941 for 13 Western European countries); Roberto Barontini and 
Lorenzo Caprio, ‘The Effect of Family Control on Firm Value and Performance. Evidence from 
Continental Europe’, 12 European Financial Management (2006) p. 689, at p. 698 (reporting an 
average wedge of 6.8% between voting and control rights). 
96  For a similar argument in the context of actions harming employees, see Gelter, supra n. 
86, at p. 163. 
97  This does not imply that the acquirer pays less than the market price, since larger packages 
of shares are typically sold at a premium. 
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While blockholders typically sell their shares in a private transaction,98 a large 
shareholder might try to avoid this by selling out on the stock market, where inves-
tors do not have this advantage. However, information about substantial sales by a 
large shareholder is likely to become publicly known soon – through mandatory 
disclosures or otherwise – but even if not, a large volume of sales during a short 
period will normally reduce prices and alert investors. Moreover, a large share-
holder will partly internalise the fraud risk through the insurance premia paid by the 
corporation long before a securities lawsuit materialises.99 A large shareholder will 
want this risk to be low in order to minimise cost. 
Overall, under ceteris paribus conditions, i.e., under the counterfactual assump-
tion that securities lawsuits are equally likely and the expected award or settlement 
is the same, the deterrent effect of issuer liability should be greater in economies 
dominated by concentrated ownership than in the US. Thus, the social utility of 
issuer liability would seem to depend on the availability of a good private enforce-
ment mechanism and the persistence of concentrated ownership; we return to these 
issues in section 5. 
4. ISSUER LIABILITY AND CREDITORS’ INCENTIVE TO MONITOR 
4.1 Subordination to creditors under US law 
So far, I have argued that risk-shifting through issuer liability can be used to create 
incentives for large shareholders to monitor. The argument developed in the previ-
ous section can be extended to creditors. In the US, the degree to which creditors 
should bear the fraud risk in publicly traded firms has been debated in the context 
of § 510(b) of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 (modified in 1984), which reads: 
For the purpose of distribution under this title, a claim arising from rescission of 
a purchase or sale of a security of the debtor or of an affiliate of the debtor, for 
damages arising from the purchase or sale of such a security, or for reimburse-
ment or contribution allowed under section 502 on account of such a claim, shall 
be subordinated to all claims or interests that are senior to or equal the claim or 
interest represented by such security, except that if such security is common 
stock, such claim has the same priority as common stock. 
This section stipulates that damages claims because of securities fraud, as well as 
claims resulting from the rescission of a securities purchase or sale, are assigned the 
same rank as shares; in other words, such claims are subordinated to those of 
                                                                                                                                                       
98  Coffee, supra n. 87, at pp. 204-205. 
99  See Park, supra n. 16, at p. 345 (pointing out that shareholders benefiting from false dis-
closures bear part of the cost of insurance). 
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‘regular’ creditors. Securities fraud claims of bondholders are even subordinated to 
claims arising directly from the equivalent bonds.100 In historical perspective, the 
1978 Act reversed the previously prevailing policy. In a 1937 decision following 
the collapse of a bank, the US Supreme Court decided that the claims of a share-
holder whose acquisition of stock had been rescinded because of fraud were ranked 
with those of unsecured creditors.101 The change in the Bankruptcy Code’s policy – 
to which the SEC objected – is often attributed to the influence of a 1973 article by 
John Slain and Homer Kripke.102 Slain and Kripke understood the issue of subordi-
nation as one about who should bear the firm’s risk, including both the risk of 
business failure and fraud risk. Given that equity investors have the chance of high 
profits, they argued that it was an implicit term of the contract between creditors, 
shareholders and the issuer for shareholders to also bear the risk of loss.103 Credi-
tors, on the other hand, should be able to rely on a certain cushion of equity.104 
Permitting shareholders to convert their equity claim into a debt claim would create 
an option that would allow them to participate in potential profits without bearing 
the risk of loss at the same time.105 
In recent years, US law has to some extent moved away from the policy of de-
prioritising defrauded investors. § 308(a) of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002.106 
created a ‘Fair Funds for Investors’ provision that allows the SEC to create a fund 
from penalties for violations of securities law agreed upon with the issuer in a settle-
ment in order to disgorge these funds to defrauded investors. While the federal courts 
                                                                                                                                                       
100  E.g., Jessica Ansell Hauser, ‘Nonconsensual Repeal of Third-Party Beneficiary Contract 
Rights: Senior Creditors under Subordination Agreements’, 8 Cardozo Law Review (1987) p. 
1227. Until the 1984 amendments, claims arising from the acquisition of stock were even subor-
dinated to the stock itself. See, e.g., Collier on Bankruptcy, 16th edn. (LexisNexis 2012) 
P.510.LH (attributing the original version to a drafting error). 
101  Oppenheimer v. Harriman Nat’l Bank & Trust Co., 301 U.S. 206, 214-215 (1937). An 
interesting wrinkle to this is that, under the banking law before 1953, shareholders were subject to 
personal liability amounting to their stocks’ par value, which also applied to the plaintiff whose 
shares had been rescinded. See John J. Slain and Homer Kripke, ‘The Interface Between Securi-
ties Regulation and Bankruptcy – Allocating the Risk between Securityholders and the Issuer’s 
Creditors’, 48 NYU Law Review (1973) p. 261, at pp. 283-284; Kenneth B. Davis Jr, ‘The Status 
of Defrauded Securityholders in Corporate Bankruptcy’, Duke Law Journal (1983) p. 1, at p. 8. 
Prior cases of appellate courts had subordinated investors’ claims. See Slain and Kripke, idem, at 
pp. 272-279; Davis, idem, at pp. 4-7. 
102  Slain and Kripke, supra n. 101, at p. 261. Regarding the article’s influence on the legisla-
tion, see H.R. 595-95 (1977) 194-196 (citing the article); Davis, supra n. 101, at pp. 10-11; 
Hauser, supra n. 100, at p. 1244. 
103  Slain and Kripke, supra n. 101, at pp. 286-287. 
104  Idem, at pp. 288-291; contra Davis, supra n. 101, at pp. 19-24. 
105  Daniel C. Cohn, ‘Subordinated Claims: Their Classification and Voting Under Chapter 11 
of the Bankruptcy Code’, 56 American Bankruptcy Law Journal (1982) p. 293, at pp. 299-300; 
Davis, supra n. 101, at pp. 34-43; Nicholas L. Georgakopoulos, ‘Strange Subordinations: Correct-
ing Bankruptcy’s § 510(b)’, 6 Bankruptcy Developments Journal (1999) p. 91, at p. 95. 
106  Public Law 107-204, 30 July 2002. 
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have recognised that this provision is to some extent at odds with the policy of 
§ 510(b), they found in the cases of Adelphia.107 and WorldCom.108 that these funds 
should not be subordinated under this provision based on a simple literal interpreta-
tion and brushing the purpose aside. Unsurprisingly, some have criticised that the 
provision undermines the purposes of subordination under bankruptcy law.109 
4.2 Distribution of risk among shareholders and creditors 
There are parallel discussions in several European countries. Interestingly, the 
question is not framed as one of subordination of investors’ claims, but as one of 
the capital maintenance principle. A payment by the issuer to shareholders could be 
seen as a restitution of capital, or a distribution to shareholders outside of the 
usually permissible types of distributions, such as dividends, reductions of capital, 
and liquidation, in which cases specific creditor protection rules apply.110 There 
have been extensive debates about the issue in Germany and Austria, where, in 
recent years, the courts have allowed issuer liability to go forward in spite of these 
objections,111 as well as in Denmark,112 Norway.113 and Sweden.114 In the Nordic 
                                                                                                                                                       
107  In re Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 327 B.R. 143, 168-170 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2005); Ad Hoc 
Adelphia Trade Claims Comm. v. Adelphia Commc’ns Corp., 337 B.R. 475, 478 (S.D.N.Y. 
2006); For an overview, see Wendy S. Walker, Alan S. Maza, David Eskew and Michael E. 
Wiles, ‘At the Crossroads: The Intersection of the Federal Securities Laws and the Bankruptcy 
Code’, 63 Business Lawyer (2007) p. 125, at pp. 141-145. 
108  SEC v. WorldCom, 273 F. Supp 2d 431, 434 (S.D.N.Y 2003); Official Comm. Unsecured 
of Creditors of WorldCom Inc. v. SEC, 467 F.3d 73, 85 (2d Cir. 2006). 
109  Walker, et al., supra n. 107, at pp. 141 and 145; Zack Christensen, ‘The Fair Funds for 
Investors Provision of Sarbanes-Oxley: Is It Unfair to Creditors of a Bankrupt Debtor?’, Univer-
sity of Illinois Law Review (2005) p. 339, at pp. 368-373; but see Douglas A. Henry, ‘Subordinat-
ing Subordination: WorldCom and the Effect of Sarbanes-Oxley’s Fair Funds Provision on 
Distributions in Bankruptcy’, 11 Emory Bankruptcy Developments Journal (2004) p. 259, at pp. 
293-300 (apparently favouring subordination). 
110  A comparative overview is provided by Hopt and Voigt, supra n. 34, at pp. 60-62. 
111  For Germany, see BGH 9.5.2005, NJW (2005), 2450; BGH 3.3.2008, NZG (2008), 386; 
for Austria, see OGH 30.3.2011, 7 Ob 77/10i, GesRZ (2011), 251, and OGH 15.3.2012, 6 Ob 
28/12d, GesRZ (2012), 252 (all rejecting the proposition that capital maintenance precludes or 
limits issuer liability). By contrast, the former German Reichsgericht generally gave precedence 
to creditor interests, RGZ 54, 128; RGZ 62, 29. 
112  Catarina af Sandeberg, ‘Prospectus Liability in a Scandinavian Perspective’, 13 European 
Business Law Review (2002) p. 323, at pp. 329-330; idem, ‘From Caveat Emptor to Caveat 
Venditor – The Winding Road to Prospectus Liability in Scandinavian Countries’, Journal of 
Business Law (2003) p. 91, at pp. 97-98; Paul Krüger Andersen, ‘Denmark’, in Hopt and Voigt, 
eds., supra n. 34, at pp. 401 and 411. 
113  Sandeberg, ‘Prospectus Liability’, idem, at p. 330; Sandeberg, ‘Caveat Emptor’, idem, at 
pp. 97-98. 
114  Sandeberg, ‘Prospectus Liability’, idem, at p. 329; Sandeberg, ‘Caveat Emptor’, idem, at 
p. 98; Rolf Skog, ‘Sweden’, in Hopt and Voigt, eds., supra n. 34, p. 935, at pp. 939-940; see also 
Fabian Walla, ‘The Swedish Capital Markets Law from a European Perspective’, 22 European 
Business Law Review (2012) p. 211, at p. 220. 
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countries, creditor interests have traditionally been given preference,115 and in 
Sweden it was still not clear in 2012 whether the issuer can be liable at all.116 The 
discussion is sometimes framed as a ‘clash of principles’, in which the sanctity of 
capital is juxtaposed to the alleged necessity of issuer liability.117 Besides the prin-
ciple of capital maintenance, it is often pointed out as well, particularly in the 
German-speaking countries, that corporate law is also characterised by the ‘theory 
of the defective association’ (Lehre vom fehlerhaften Verband
.
), according to which 
members of a business association cannot normally withdraw their contribution by 
showing that they have been enticed to become a member through fraud or error.118 
As with respect to capital maintenance, the underlying policy is to protect creditors, 
who are thought to be more distant from the business risk than these members.119 
The theory has also been given recognition in Article 12 of the recodified First 
Directive,120 at least to some extent, as it restricts the national legislatures’ ability to 
provide for the nullity of the company to a limited set of cases and to an ex nunc 
effect, which might imply that a rescission of an acquisition of shares from the firm 
on the grounds of fraud is not permissible.121 
While courts in Germany and Austria (and many scholars) have recently fa-
voured issuer liability,122 some scholars seem to prefer capital maintenance to the 
extent that it should completely preclude issuer liability to shareholders.123 Others 
have taken an intermediate position and suggested that it should rule out liability 
only to the extent that it would reduce the issuer’s equity below its legal capital; in 
                                                                                                                                                       
115  Sandeberg, ‘Prospectus Liability’, supra n. 112, at pp. 323 and 333-334; Sandeberg, ‘Ca-
veat Emptor’, idem, at pp. 92-93 and 101. 
116  Walla, supra n. 114, at p. 220. 
117  E.g., Walter Bayer, ‘Emittentenhaftung versus Kapitalerhaltung’, 67 Wertpapier-
Mitteilungen (2013) p. 961, at p. 961. 
118  In the context of issuer liability, see Carsten Schäfer, ‘Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung 
und die Lehre vom fehlerhaften Verband’, 33 Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftsrecht (ZIP) (2012) p. 
2421. 
119  Christoph Andreas Weber, ‘Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung und gesellschaftsrechtliche 
Kapitalbindung – ein einheitliches Problem mit rechtsformübergreifender Lösung?’, 176 
Zeitschrift für das gesamte Handels- und Wirtschaftsrecht (ZHR) (2012) p. 184, at p. 193. 
120  Directive 2009/101/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 
2009 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of the interests of members and third 
parties, are required by Member States of companies within the meaning of the second paragraph 
of Article 48 of the Treaty, with a view to making such safeguards equivalent, 2009 OJ L 258/11. 
121  Arguably, the ECJ accepted the theory in E. Friz GmbH v. Carsten von der Heyden, Case 
C-215/08, where a consumer attempted to withdraw from a closed-end real estate investment 
fund. 
122  Supra n. 111. 
123  E.g., Norbert Horn, ‘Zur Haftung der AG und ihrer Organmitglieder für unrichtige oder 
unterlassene Ad-hoc-Information’, in Festschrift für Peter Ulmer (De Gruyter 2003) p. 817, at pp. 
826-827; Carsten Schäfer, ‘Effektivere Vorstandshaftung für Fehlinformation des Kapitalmarkts?’, 
Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht (2005) p. 985; Michael Gruber, ‘Prospekthaftung der AG 
versus Kapitalerhaltung’, GesRZ (2010) p. 73, at p. 75; Eckert, supra n. 31, at p. 98. 
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other words, only funds that would otherwise be available for a dividend could be 
awarded to plaintiffs.124 Some authors have favoured subordination of investor 
claims (following US law).125 The question arises not only on the level of national 
corporate laws, but also on that of EU law, which enshrines the prohibition against 
distributions to shareholders outside dividends in Article 15 of the Second EU 
Company Law Directive and at the same time gives the option of implementing 
issuer liability to the Member States.126 For this reason, a preliminary reference case 
is currently pending before the ECJ.127 
The main (although not only) argument of both the German.128 and Austrian 
courts.129 in their leading decisions is that the claims of plaintiff shareholders are no 
different from other liability claims; corporate assets are not affected in a different 
way than claims of non-shareholder creditors.130 Conceptual arguments of this type 
unfortunately permeate the doctrinal debate, even though they are not helpful for a 
policy analysis.131 To adequately address the policy question underlying the legal 
debate, it does not suffice to say that the legal capital system has been subject to 
intense scrutiny in the past ten years, with most economically sophisticated scholars 
believing it to be of no real use to creditors.132 It is of course true that creditors 
cannot rely on the availability of the firm’s stated capital, which can be easily 
dissipated through losses without violating legal capital rules.133 Relatedly, those 
who prioritise issuer liability sometimes argue that creditors cannot expect capital 
                                                                                                                                                       
124  E.g., Susanne Kalss, Anlegerinteressen (Springer 2001), at p. 221; Rüdiger Veil, ‘Die Ad-
hoc-Publizitätshaftung im System kapitalmarktrechtlicher Informationshaftung’, 167 ZHR (2003) 
p. 365, at p. 395; Peter Doralt and Martin Winner, Münchener Kommentar zum Aktiengesetz, Vol. 
1, 3rd edn. (C.H. Beck 2008) § 57 ¶261. 
125  E.g., Baums, supra n. 15, at p. 170; Katja Langenbucher, ‘Kapitalerhaltung und Kapital-
markthaftung’, ZIP (2005) p. 239, at pp. 244-245. 
126  Günter H. Roth, ‘Kapitalerhaltung versus Prospekthaftung: Die europäischen Richtlinien’, 
134 Juristische Blätter (JBl) (2012) p. 73, at p. 74; Weber, supra n. 119, at p. 188. 
127  Supra n. 8. 
128  BGH NJW 2005, 2452; see also BGH NZG 2008, 387. 
129  OGH GesRZ 2011, 253; OGH GesRZ 2012, 254. 
130  BGH NJW 2005, 2452. 
131  Another question is which principle is the lex specialis and which the lex posterior. E.g., 
Walter Bayer, in Doralt and Winner, supra n. 124, § 57 ¶20. This is of obvious relevance for legal 
interpretation, but entirely irrelevant for the policy argument made in this paper. Under EU law, a 
conceptual question is whether a payment to shareholders under an issuer liability claim constitutes 
a distribution under Art. 15 of the Second Directive. E.g., Bayer, supra n. 117, at pp. 966-967. 
132  Hopt and Voigt, supra n. 34, at p. 63. See also Möllers and Leisch, supra n. 33, ¶40 (sug-
gesting that issuer liability should take precedence because it facilitates obtaining capital from the 
stock market). Equivalently, one might say that stronger capital maintenance makes taking out 
credit marginally easier. See Weber, supra n. 119, at p. 201 (pointing out that creditors, like 
shareholders, are capable of adjusting on the market). 
133  E.g., Luca Enriques and Jonathan R. Macey, ‘Creditors Versus Capital Formation: The 
Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules’, 86 Cornell Law Review (2001) p. 1165, at p. 
1186. 
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not to be dissipated by issuer liability claims, as they cannot rely on its protection 
from any other managerial actions.134 As we shall see shortly, applying the capital 
maintenance principle to issuer liability clearly would have a redistributive effect 
that changes the incentives for the affected parties. The other line of criticism 
against legal capital is to doubt the necessity of creditor protection as a whole, 
given that many (but not all) creditors can protect themselves through covenants, 
risk premia in the interest rate they charge, and the simple refusal to extend 
credit.135 As we have seen above, there are equivalent arguments for shareholders, 
who can protect themselves against fraud risk through diversification.136 
The discussion in the US has shown that the policy question underlying the 
shareholder-creditor debate is about who should bear the risk that investors are 
defrauded if only the issuer is available as a defendant, namely either creditors or 
those investors themselves.137 Risk bearing also plays a role in the German debate: 
proponents of subordination of investor claims argue that fraud risk is typical of 
equity and should therefore remain with shareholders.138 It has been suggested that 
shareholders have more influence on the corporation and are therefore positioned to 
ensure that individual directors and officers are ultimately held liable.139 By con-
trast, advocates of the primacy of issuer liability claims have argued that sharehold-
ers bear greater risk and therefore need to be better protected than creditors.140 
                                                                                                                                                       
134  Baums, supra n. 15, at p. 169; Holger Fleischer, ‘Konturen der kapitalmarktrechtlichen 
Informationsdeliktshaftung’, 26 ZIP (2005) p. 1805, at p. 1811; Matthias Casper, ‘Haftung für 
fehlerhafte Information des Kapitalmarktes’, Der Konzern (2006) p. 32, at p. 37. 
135  E.g., Enriques and Macey, supra n. 133, at pp. 1188-1195; John Armour, ‘Legal Capital: 
An Outdated Concept?’, 7 European Business Organization Law Review (EBOR) (2006) p. 5, at 
pp. 16-17. Of course, this does not apply to tort creditors. In the given context of issuer liability, 
see Nikolai Vokuhl, Kapitalmarktrechtlicher Anlegerschutz und Kapitalerhaltung in der Aktien-
gesellschaft (Nomos 2007), at pp. 170-171. Even though this argument is correct, capital mainte-
nance may not be pointless if the courts apply a ‘concealed distributions’ doctrine that forces 
firms to treat all shareholders equally and restricts asset transfers between the corporation and its 
shareholders to certain transparent paths, such as dividend payments and reduction of capital, 
which makes looting the company harder. See, e.g., Peter O. Mülbert and Max Birke, ‘Legal 
Capital – Is There a Case Against the European Legal Capital Rules’, 3 EBOR (2002) p. 695, at 
pp. 705-706; Luca Enriques and Martin Gelter, ‘Regulatory Competition in European Company 
Law and Creditor Protection’, 7 EBOR (2006) p. 417, at pp. 426-427; Thomas Bachner, Creditor 
Protection in Private Companies (Cambridge University Press 2009), at pp. 122-138. 
136  Supra section 2.1. 
137  Weber, supra n. 119, at p. 202. 
138  Baums, supra n. 15, at p. 170; Langenbucher, supra n. 125, at p. 242. 
139  Langenbucher, supra n. 125; Peter Kindler, ‘Gesellschaftsrechtliche Grenzen der Emitten-
tenhaftung am Kapitalmarkt – Eine Nachlese zum Fall “EM.TV” vor dem Hintergrund zwischen-
zeitlicher Entwicklungen’, in Peter Kindler, Jens Koch, Peter Ulmer and Martin Winter, eds., 
Festschrift für Uwe Hüffer zum 70. Geburtstag (C.H. Beck 2010) p. 417, at p. 424. 
140  E.g., Hartwig Henze, in Klaus Hopt and Herbert Wiedemann, eds., Großkommentar Aktien-
gesetz, Vol. 2, 4th edn. (De Gruyter 2000/2012), § 57 ¶20. 
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Including US law and the various possible interpretations of capital mainte-
nance, there are at least four possible options (Table 1 below). 
First, if capital maintenance completely precludes liability to shareholders, the 
defrauded investors bear the risk. There is no additional risk for creditors, and not 
even for the other shareholders, since there is no risk spreading (as described in 
section 2.1) (1). 
Second, if capital maintenance limits liability to distributable reserves, risk is 
spread across shareholders except if there are no distributable reserves. In this case, 
however, shares will usually have little or no value anyway (2). 
Third, if the claims of investors are subordinated (as in the US), the risk is in 
principle spread across shareholders. However, no risk spreading happens if the 
firm is in bankruptcy (which is presumably a smaller set of circumstances than the 
situation where there are merely no distributable reserves), given that, typically, 
shareholders will not receive anything. In this case (as in the second one), creditors 
might still face a somewhat increased risk because payments that happen before 
insolvency (or as long as there are distributable reserves) will increase the probabil-
ity that the firm will later become insolvent (3). 
Finally, if the claims of investors are assigned the rank of unsecured creditors’ 
claims, creditors share the fraud risk with the defrauded shareholders if the firm 
becomes insolvent (if the firm is not insolvent, the fraud risk is spread across 
shareholders as described in section 2.1) (4). 










Full risk No Risk No fraud risk 








to share (no risk if 
no distributable 
reserves) 
Risk of loss smaller 
than under (3), but 
greater than under (1) 
(3) Subordination 




to share (de facto full 
risk if insolvent) 
Risk proportionate 
to share (de facto 
no additional risk 
if insolvent) 
Increased risk 
because of liability 





Full risk if firm is 
insolvent 
In Table 1, the risk borne by creditors increases from (1) to (4). The risk under rule 
(3) will typically be higher than under rule (2) because financial statements will 
often not show a distributable surplus even if the firm is not yet insolvent. 
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4.3 Incentivising creditors to monitor 
Slain and Kripke argued that creditors should be able to rely on a certain cushion of 
equity and saw subordination of shareholder claims as a means to that end.141 
Similar arguments have been brought forward in the German debate.142 Taking this 
argument to its logical conclusion, one would have to choose rule (1) above and not 
permit any issuer liability, in which case creditors would bear no fraud risk at all. 
Even the other shareholders’ risk would be eliminated, which means that the moni-
toring incentive described in section 3.2 would disappear. Moreover, as mentioned 
above, the argument that creditors can rely on a particular equity in the firm has 
long been discredited in the capital maintenance debate. One can argue that sophis-
ticated creditors are able to adjust to risk, just as sophisticated investors can adjust 
prices to take a marginally higher risk of fraud into account. It is thus more promis-
ing to investigate whether shareholders or creditors are the better risk bearers by 
virtue of being better diversified or able to adjust to fraud risk.143 Bondholders or 
banks with a broadly spread portfolio of outstanding loans can also be good risk 
bearers.144 
I have argued above, given circularity and the mismatch between social cost and 
investor claims, that the policy objective of issuer liability is not compensating 
investors but enhancing the functioning of the capital market (section 2). For this 
reason, risk spreading is primarily important also for creditors because it creates 
incentives to prevent capital market fraud (section 3). While there has been some 
debate about the allocation of fraud risk between shareholders and creditors, there 
has been little discussion about the incentives it sets. 
The overall policy decision should therefore favour priority of issuer liability to 
investors since it will strengthen incentives for financial institutions to monitor. The 
decisive question is therefore whether plaintiff shareholders or creditors would ex 
ante be better positioned to monitor management.145 In spite of changes over the 
                                                                                                                                                       
141  Slain and Kripke, supra n. 101, at pp. 288-291. 
142  E.g., Kindler, supra n. 139, at p. 422 (arguing that shareholders collectively committed 
capital to current and future creditors); Schäfer, supra n. 118, at p. 2422 (suggesting that share-
holders entered a ‘community of risk’ by obtaining shares in a new issue and, to protect the 
interests of third parties, therefore cannot easily withdraw their contribution). These arguments, 
however, are largely conceptual in nature and rest on the question whether these investors should 
be considered shareholders, given that their decision to buy was based on false information. E.g., 
Fleischer, supra n. 134, at p. 1810; Langenbucher, supra n. 125, at p. 242 (both noting that an 
unlawful action preceded the acquisition of shares); Casper, supra n. 134, at p. 37 (suggesting 
that these individuals should be considered creditors rather than shareholder). The controversy 
illustrates that a largely conceptual discussion that does not primarily consider the incentives set 
by risk for the parties involved is not likely to yield fruitful results. 
143  See also Davis, supra n. 101, at p. 63 (discussing the broader spread of risk). 
144  For a similar argument, see Weber, supra n. 119, at p. 206. 
145  Davis, supra n. 101, at p. 66; see also Georgakopoulos, supra n. 105, at p. 95. 
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past twenty years, Continental European corporate governance still tends, to a large 
extent, to be bank-centric. Compared to the US and the UK, bank loans (and some-
times loans from consortia of banks) still play a greater role in the debt structure of 
Continental European companies.146 Generally, debt is thought to be diffused in the 
US, and comparatively concentrated in both the UK and Continental Europe.147 
Large banks should normally be capable of protecting themselves against credit 
risk posed by business lenders, but they also often interact closely with and monitor 
management.148 This applies in particular in the traditional situation where one 
financial institution serves as an industrial firm’s Hausbank (main bank) and is 
therefore included in many important decision-making processes.149 Such a position 
will often enable a financial institution to reduce the probability of false informa-
tion provided by management to the capital markets. Even if the role of large, 
voluntary lenders seems to have decreased in Europe in the past twenty years, they 
                                                                                                                                                       
146  European Central Bank, ‘Corporate Finance in the Euro Area’, Occasional Paper No. 
63/2007, at p. 13, available at: <http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scpops/ecbocp63.pdf> (showing that 
bank loans amounted to 29.1% of firms’ capital in 2005, compared to 3.5% for debt securities 
excluding derivatives); European Central Bank, idem, at p. 17 (showing that loans amounted to 
89.2% and debt securities to 10.8% of total debt in the eurozone, compared to 60.7% for loans 
and 39.3% for securities in the US, and 73.5% for loans and 26.5% for securities in the UK). 
147  John Armour, Brian R. Cheffins and David A. Skeel Jr, ‘Corporate Ownership Structure 
and the Evolution of Bankruptcy Law: Lessons from the United Kingdom’, 55 Vanderbilt Law 
Review (2002) p. 1699, at pp. 1763-1777 (describing the development of debt structure in evolu-
tionary terms). 
148  On monitoring by creditors, see, generally, Douglas G. Baird and Robert K. Rasmussen, 
‘Private Debt and the Missing Lever in Corporate Governance’, 154 University of Pennsylvania 
Law Review (2006) p. 1209, at pp. 1242-1250; Joanna M. Shepherd, Frederick Tung and Albert 
H. Yoon, ‘What Else Matters for Corporate Governance? The Case of Bank Monitoring’, 88 
Boston University Law Review (2008) p. 991; Frederick Tung, ‘Leverage in the Boardroom: The 
Unsung Influence of Private Lenders in Corporate Governance’, 57 UCLA Law Review (2009) p. 
115; Charles K. Whitehead, ‘Creditors and Corporate Governance’, in Claire A. Hill and Brett H. 
McDonnell, eds., Research Handbook on the Economics of Corporate Law (2012) p. 68, at p. 73. 
149  The role of the Hausbank has traditionally been strong in Germany and has often been 
studied in the literature on business finance and corporate governance. E.g., Theodor Baums, 
‘Corporate Governance in Germany: The Role of the Banks’, 40 American Journal of Compara-
tive Law (1992) p. 503; David Charny, ‘The German Corporate Governance System’, Columbia 
Business Law Review (1998) p. 145, at pp. 151-157; Brian R. Cheffins, ‘The Metamorphosis of 
“Germany Inc.”: The Case of Executive Pay’, 49 American Journal of Comparative Law (2001) 
p. 497, at pp. 500-501. However, German banks seem to have reduced their industrial sharehold-
ings in recent years, partly because of the 2000 elimination of a capital gains tax on equity sales 
and some changes to corporate law. Cheffins, idem, at pp. 502-503; Dariusz Wojzik, ‘Change in 
the German Model of Corporate Governance: Evidence from Blockholdings 1997-2001’, 35 
Environment and Planning A (2003) p. 1431; Sigurt Vitols, ‘Das “neue” deutsche Corporate 
Governance-System: Ein zukunftsfähiges Modell?’, in Ulrich Jürgens, Dieter Sadowski, Gunnar 
Folke Schuppert and Manfred Weiss, eds., Perspektiven der Corporate Governance (Nomos 
2007) p. 76, at pp. 82-83 (tracing the decline of ownership concentration); Luttermann and du 
Plessis, supra n. 85, at pp. 332-333. 
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are likely still better able to monitor than many other groups, in particular the 
typical plaintiffs in a securities lawsuit.150 It follows that a rule that permits issuer 
liability and shifts some of the risk to creditors is preferable.151 Incentives for 
creditors seem particularly important when the corporation is approaching insol-
vency and both managers and large shareholders may be ‘gambling for resurrec-
tion’. 
When we compare the various rules proposed in Table 1, the complete preclu-
sion of liability because of the capital maintenance principle appears particularly 
problematic, given that the risk is not even shifted to other shareholders. In many 
European countries, large shareholders often retain significant positions even after 
going public and are, in fact, sometimes involved in capital market fraud. It is 
particularly important for large shareholders to retain an incentive to monitor. If 
capital maintenance took precedence, incentives for both large shareholders and 
creditors to prevent misinformation would be reduced. From a doctrinal perspec-
tive, it seems absurd how prioritising capital maintenance distorts the doctrine’s 
usual purpose to an opposite effect: normally, the capital maintenance principle is 
intended to prevent the flow of corporate assets to large shareholders, to the detri-
ment of both minority shareholders and creditors. Here, capital maintenance bene-
fits large shareholders to the detriment of outside investors. Rules (2) and (3) 
increase the risk for lenders, and hence the incentive to monitor, to some extent, but 
not as much as rule (4), which completely prioritises issuer liability. 
In order to set the right incentives, ideally one would want to expose only large 
lenders to the risk of issuer liability, and not, e.g., small suppliers or even tort 
creditors, who are obviously not well positioned to monitor. As discussed in section 
3, the same applies to shareholders. In principle, one could, as some authors have 
suggested, subordinate or preclude claims by large shareholders only,152 or treat 
issuer liability to investors as a restitution of capital to the large shareholder, thus 
exposing the latter to liability to the firm in the wake of an investor suit.153 With 
respect to creditors, similar mechanisms would be more difficult to put into place 
since creditors’ incentives to monitor are only set by the somewhat increased 
likelihood of the issuer’s insolvency resulting from liability claims against the 
issuer. A mechanism that would burden only large creditors that are actually posi-
tioned to monitor might not be possible to create without foregoing an important 
advantage of issuer liability, namely, that it is not necessary to personally implicate 
                                                                                                                                                       
150  Weber, supra n. 119, at pp. 202-203 (pointing out that it may have made sense to impose 
the risk on shareholders in the late 19th and early 20th century, but not today, when most inves-
tors are not personally known to the issuer’s management). 
151  But see Eckert, supra n. 31, at p. 95 (suggesting that it would be absurd to expect creditors 
to monitor the issuer’s information policies). 
152  Johannes Reich-Rohrwig, Grundsatzfragen der Kapitalerhaltung (Manz 2004), at pp. 
365-366 (proposing a relatively low limit of €40,000 under Austrian law, based on an analogy). 
153  Susanne Kalss, ‘Kapitalmarktinformationshaftung – Runde wie viel?’, GesRZ (2012) p. 150. 
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the creditor in a securities lawsuit. Creating some risk for other, smaller creditors in 
the process may be a small price to pay for a solution that does not require major 
changes in the legal framework. The marginal risk borne by, e.g., a small supplier is 
likely negligible, in terms of both creating incentives and the danger of such credi-
tors getting into financial difficulty themselves. 
A possible objection could be that financial institutions, given their centrality to 
the economy, should not shoulder too much risk. Given the numerous bank bailouts 
in recent years, one might argue that bearing additional risk from loans to firms 
subject to issuer liability claims might push some financial institutions over the 
edge. In the end, however, it is important to note that this is an unlikely scenario. A 
risk of loss will only materialise if the borrower is subject to large issuer liability 
claims that ultimately result in its insolvency. Even if the loan is large and the 
issuer is an important client, this marginal risk should not be an excessive burden 
for a bank with a well-diversified loan portfolio to shoulder. Other than those toxic 
assets that caused severe problems for many financial institutions in recent years, 
the possibility of issuer liability claims in different firms in the portfolio typically 
does not create correlated risks. However, the remaining risk may still create a 
marginal incentive for the individuals within the bank in charge of specific issuers 
to push the borrower to avoid publication of false or misleading information to the 
capital markets. 
5. SHOULD EUROPE STRENGTHEN PRIVATE ENFORCEMENT OF 
SECURITIES LAW? 
As shown by the discussion of the cost of securities fraud in section 2.2, the objec-
tive of securities litigation cannot be to serve the private interests of misled inves-
tors, but must be the broader goal of a better functioning capital market. One could 
therefore argue that enforcement should be in the hands of a public regulator, such 
as the SEC, whose goal should clearly be to eliminate frictions in the market caused 
by opportunistic behaviour. This might lead us to abandon investor litigation, given 
its considerable cost and the mismatched incentive of private plaintiffs. In fact, 
Jackson and Roe’s finding that, across countries, strong regulators are better predic-
tors of developed securities markets than effective private enforcement.154 might be 
read in support of this view.155 Nevertheless, this does not mean that private en-
forcement cannot be part of a cocktail of enforcement mechanisms.156 Private actors 
                                                                                                                                                       
154  Jackson and Roe, supra n. 2. 
155  See also Rose, supra n. 57, at pp. 45-49 (suggesting that the SEC’s new whistleblower 
programme may undermine the need for securities class actions). 
156  See James D. Cox, Randell S. Thomas and Dana Kiku, ‘SEC Enforcement Heuristics: An 
Empirical Inquiry’, 53 Duke Law Journal (2003) p. 737, at pp. 763-77 (finding that firms targeted 
by SEC enforcement actions tend to be smaller than defendant firms in securities class actions). 
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motivated by monetary gains may ensure enforcement where, for example, regula-
tors shy away from it for fear of antagonising powerful economic and political 
actors. Private actions may in fact be more valuable in smaller countries, where 
politics and the business world are often very closely intertwined, than in the US, 
where economic power is relatively dispersed. Moreover, the analysis of the inter-
action of securities litigation with financial structures in sections 3 and 4 has shown 
that private actions might be a relatively easy way of incentivising monitoring. 
Given the relative scarcity of securities litigation in Continental systems with 
concentrated financial structures, one could even argue that strong private enforce-
ment of securities law has not been tried where it might be most effective. 
Given these structures, Continental Europe seems to have a sharp instrument 
available, but it must first muster the strength to pick it up. Private enforcement of 
securities law still faces more hurdles than in the US, where securities class actions 
are common. Since these are based on an opt-out system, an entire class of plain-
tiffs is automatically involved, which creates a strong threat against the defen-
dant.157 The incentive structure is based on the idea of the ‘private attorney general’, 
in other words, private enforcement with – hopefully beneficial – public effects.158 
The plaintiff attorney often receives a contingency fee of about 20-30% of the 
damages award or settlement.159 In combination with the American system of 
having each party pay its own litigation cost independent of who wins the case, 
there are strong incentives to bring suits without particularly high risks for the 
plaintiff.160 Moreover, pre-trial discovery permits the parties, at a relatively early 
stage in the trial, to ask the court to order the opponent to make pertinent informa-
tion and documents accessible.161 Consequently, a claim that is good enough to 
                                                                                                                                                       
157  E.g., Manning Gilbert Warren III, ‘The U.S. Securities Class Action: An Unlikely Export 
to the European Union’, 37 Brooklyn Journal of International Law (2012) p. 1075, at p. 1082. 
158  E.g., Möllers, supra n. 22, at p. 261; Fox, supra n. 16, at pp. 318-319; Gerard Hertig, Rei-
nier Kraakman and Edward Rock, ‘Issuers and Investor Protection’, in Kraakman, et al., The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law, supra n. 6, p. 275, at pp. 295-296. 
159  E.g., Park, supra n. 16, at p. 348. 
160  E.g., Möllers, supra n. 22, at p. 267. The effects of the ‘English rule’ of litigation risk 
should not be overestimated, since usually cost is reimbursed on the basis of the official rate set 
by the bar association. E.g., § 91 II ZPO (Germany); § 41 Abs 2 ZPO (Austria). See Martin 
Gelter, ‘Why Do Shareholder Derivative Suits Remain Rare in Continental Europe’, 37 Brooklyn 
Journal of International Law (2012) p. 843, at pp. 863-864 (discussing Germany, France and 
Italy). Regarding the incentives set by damages awards, including punitive damages, see also 
Warren, supra n. 157, at p. 1082. 
161  Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 26. See, e.g., Guido Ferrarini and Paolo Giudici, 
‘Financial Scandals and the Role of Private Enforcement’, ECGI Working Paper No. 40 (2005), 
at pp. 50-51, available at: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=730403>; Möllers, supra n. 22, at p. 267; 
Nathan M. Crystal and Francesca Giannoni-Crystal, ‘Understanding Akzo Nobel: A Comparison 
of the Status of In-House Counsel, the Scope of the Attorney-Client Privilege, and Discovery in 
the U.S. and Europe’, 11 Global Jurist (2011) p. 1, at pp. 23-24; Warren, supra n. 157, at p. 1082. 
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survive an early motion to dismiss has a very high potential payoff. Punitive dam-
ages make securities class actions even more attractive.162 
This article does not seek to substantiate that securities class actions in the US are 
socially beneficial. Indeed, the very opposite may be the case, and plaintiff lawyers 
may well be able to earn significant rents. I have argued that issuer liability would be 
potentially more valuable in Continental Europe. The problem is, however, that 
securities lawsuits tend to be comparatively difficult, since the factors just listed tend 
to be absent in Europe.163 Various wheels and cogs in the machine would have to be 
replaced to facilitate litigation and thus harness the powers of issuer liability. 
The social cost of liability is not harm to investors, but various allocative ineffi-
ciencies that are spread out across a variety of market participants.164 Any compen-
sation paid to investors should therefore be seen as a bounty awarded to the plaintiff 
who called out those who violated the rules of the market. Given the possible 
benefits for the capital market, the nuisance of some additional litigation by alleged 
‘predatory shareholders’ may be a relatively small price to pay to improve deter-
rence. Moreover, the stronger the deterrent effect, the fewer opportunities to sue. 
Notably, there have been steps in several jurisdictions, notably Germany,165 the 
UK.166 and Italy,167 to facilitate collective lawsuits by investors. The Dutch Act on 
the Collective Settlement of Mass Claims of 2005 has maybe gone the farthest by 
allowing model suits brought by entities with the objective to represent specific 
interests (such as consumers or investors), requiring members of the group to opt 
out if they do not want to be bound by the decision.168 In Austria, in several cases, 
                                                                                                                                                       
162  Warren, idem, at p. 1082. 
163  For a comparison, see Warren, idem, at pp. 1085-1087. 
164  Section 2.2 above. 
165  In 2005, Germany introduced the Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz – KapMuG (Act 
on Model Investor Litigation), BGBl I S. 2437. The Act was reformed in 2012 (BGBl. I S. 2182). 
Model litigation under the Act does not truly provide a class action and still necessitates individ-
ual suits, but has the effect of an ascertainment of facts that are binding on parallel suits. The 
2012 reform allows plaintiffs to register claims in order to avoid preclusion (§ 10 II KapMuG). 
E.g., Burkhard Schneider and Heiko Heppner, ‘KapMuG Reloaded – Das neue Kapitalanleger-
Musterverfahrensgesetz’, Betriebs-Berater (BB) (2012) p. 2703, at p. 2705. 
166  See Eilís Ferran, ‘Are US-Style Investor Suits Coming to the UK?’, 9 Journal of Corpo-
rate Law Studies (2009) p. 315, at pp. 321-322 (pointing out that Civil Procedure (Amendment) 
Rules 2000, SI 2000/221, Art. 9 and Schedule 2 facilitate ‘case management of claims which give 
rise to common or related issues of fact or law by means of a group litigation order (GLO)’). 
167  Art. 140-bis Codice del consumo permits consumer associations or groups of consumers 
to initiate litigation, among others, against issuers. Individuals must opt in to participate. See 
Paolo Giudici, ‘Representative Litigation in Italian Capital Markets: Italian Derivative Suits and 
(If Ever) Securities Class Actions’, 6 European Company and Financial Law Review (2009) p. 
246, at pp. 258-264. 
168  Art. 3:305a Burgerlijk Wetboek; see Deborah R. Henssler, ‘The Future of Mass Litigation: 
Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding’, 79 George Washington Law Review 
(2011) p. 306, at pp. 310-320. 
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plaintiffs assigned their claims to the Consumer Protection Association, which then 
enforced them in joint lawsuits.169 Given that the features of these European proce-
dural laws do not resemble those of US class actions most inviting to abusive 
litigation (they are based on an opt-in model and do not provide contingency fees), 
the latter does not seem to be a large risk. 
Generally, there is considerable scepticism regarding a further diffusion of the 
American class action model. Following the 2011 Public Consultation on Collective 
Redress,170 the EU Commission issued a Recommendation on the topic in 2013.171 In 
line with the responses to the consultation, the Commission advises against contin-
gency fees, the ‘American rule’ on litigation cost, punitive damages, and even an opt-
out model.172 It may thus be more promising to use the Sarbanes-Oxley Act’s ‘Fair 
Funds for Investors’ rule as a model in securities law,173 or, as suggested in the Rec-
ommendation,174 to develop other litigation models which are primarily publicly 
funded and which could be based on existing models in the area of consumer protec-
tion, where consumer associations are sometimes given standing.175 
Politically, stronger securities litigation may be hard to come by in Europe. 
First, in Europe, as in the US, there are of course often discussions about abusive 
litigation. To have a deterrent effect, litigation needs to be more than a nuisance to 
defendants. While there have been efforts to rein in securities class actions in the 
US,176 they perhaps have been allowed to develop over the decades because they 
did not particularly hurt those groups dominating business interests while at the 
same time they created benefits for another powerful group, namely lawyers. 
Second, the interest groups involved in corporate governance lawmaking differ 
between Europe and the US. While managers are obviously not thrilled about 
                                                                                                                                                       
169  Susanne Kalss, ‘Civil Law Protection of Investors in Austria – A Situation Report from 
Amidst a Wave of Investor Lawsuits’, 13 EBOR (2012) p. 211, at pp. 215-217. 
170  See Public Consultation: Towards A Coherent Approach on Collective Redress, available 
at: <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/consultations/2011_collective_redress/index_en.html>. 
171  Commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on common principles for injunctive and 
compensatory collective redress mechanisms in the Member States concerning violations of 
rights granted under Union Law, 2013/396/EU, 2013 OJ L 201/60. 
172  Commission Recommendation, idem, Arts. 13, 21, 29-31; see also Warren, supra n. 157, 
at p. 1112 (summarising the results of the public consultation responses); see also Stephan 
Madaus, ‘Die Kontrolle unternehmerischen Handels durch eine europäische class action – eine 
unmögliche Quadratur des Kreises’, in Daphne Aichberger-Beig, et al., eds., Jahrbuch Junger 
Zivilrechtswissenschaftler 2010 (Boorberg 2011) p. 103, at pp. 114-115 (suggesting that a toned-
down European action incorporating the critique of US class actions would have been ineffec-
tive). 
173  Supra nn. 106-109 and accompanying text; Warren, supra n. 157, at pp. 1109-1110. 
174  Arts. 4-7. 
175  See Gerhard Wagner, ‘Collective Redress – Categories of Loss and Legislative Options’, 
127 Law Quarterly Review (2011) p. 55, at p. 57. 
176  Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, Pub. L. 104-67, 109 Stat. 737 (heighten-
ing pleading standards for 10b-5 suits). 
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litigation based on their perceived wrongdoing on either side of the Atlantic, the 
ostensible beneficiaries are investors. Given how widespread share ownership is in 
the US, in part because of retirement savings, the interest of shareholders has, in 
recent decades, increasingly been identified with the public interest, which would 
have made it politically very difficult to abolish securities class actions.177 Even if 
the actual governance effects of these lawsuits were negligible, the existence of a 
shareholder remedy might have created the perception of a functioning system and 
thus pre-empted more intrusive regulation.178 In comparative perspective, in much 
of Europe, share ownership does not have the political salience it has in the US, in 
part because of the relatively small importance of securities markets over many 
decades, in part because of differences in the pension system.179 Shareholders are 
not identified with the median voter. Moreover, there may be a second, more 
sinister force at work: given the effects on how issuer liability shifts fraud risks on 
large shareholders and creditors, stronger shareholder litigation might actually have 
had a more significant – and therefore unpleasant – deterrent effect than in the US. 
Political pressure from powerful corporate governance players may therefore be 
more strongly stacked against it. 
6. CONCLUSION 
This article has attempted to make two major points. First, the objective of liability 
for misstatements on the capital markets (including both prospectus liability and 
liability on secondary markets) cannot be compensation, but only deterrence. The 
optimal level of deterrence should therefore be at the centre of policy debates. 
Second, given the limitations of individual liability, issuer liability could be a 
powerful mechanism to deter securities fraud. Contrary to the situation in the US, 
where the penalty implicit in issuer liability is spread out across a diffuse mass of 
investors with little power to influence management, in Continental Europe there 
are often large shareholders with some preventative capability that could be incen-
tivised to better select and monitor management. Even after 15 years of debate 
about convergence in corporate governance and some ‘unwinding’ of blockholders 
in countries such as Germany,180 structures where large shareholders or coalitions of 
shareholders dominate firms persist to a significant degree across the Continent. 
Even in the UK, where in recent years steps to facilitate investor suits have been 
taken, share ownership is less dispersed than in the US, which might create some 
potential for socially valuable litigation. 
                                                                                                                                                       
177  Bratton and Wachter, supra n. 5, at pp. 136-142. 
178  Idem, at p. 147. 
179  Gelter, supra n. 80, at pp. 963-968. 
180  Supra n. 149 and accompanying text. 
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If issuer liability’s function is public rather than private, there is an argument 
that it should be replaced with stronger regulation.181 Arguably, criminal enforce-
ment in the US has become significantly more effective since the Sarbanes-Oxley 
Act was passed.182 The effects of regulation, however, depend on how well regula-
tors are endowed. It seems more persuasive to see regulation and litigation as two 
complementary forms of enforcement. Weaker liability may be compensated by 
stronger regulation, and vice versa. 
                                                                                                                                                       
181  Cf. Fox, supra n. 16, at pp. 319-320 (expressing scepticism from the perspective of a cost-
benefit analysis). 
182  Bratton and Wachter, supra n. 5, at pp. 115-117. 
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